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 1 
Summary 
On 18 March 2016, the European Council published a press release on their 
deal with Turkey to readmit asylum seekers from the Greek Islands. It was 
headed 'EU-Turkey Statement'. In return for accepting the readmitted 
migrants, Turkey would receive financial compensation and increased 
possibilities of visa freedom and EU membership.  
In the general public, the agreement was criticized for shifting 
responsibility for asylum seekers from the EU to Turkey, a country with a 
questionable human rights record and a recently established asylum system. 
In discussions among lawyers, the agreement has been characterized by its 
indefinite nature. It had been concluded by the European Council in violation 
of the treaties and without obtaining the European Parliament's approval. If 
the agreement were binding under international law, this would mean that the 
EU's primary law on international agreements had not been respected. When 
the issue was to be resolved, the General Court found that the agreement had 
not been concluded by the EU at all, but by the Member States. This finding 
was met with severe criticism. 
   This thesis provides an in-depth explanation of these issues by considering 
the interplay between law and politics. The text addresses various arguments 
on whether the agreement is binding and whether it is the EU or the Member 
States that are its parties. Thereafter, it considers how the agreement’s non-
traditional form makes it easier for the EU to avoid accountability. It also 
examines why the agreement looks the way it does. The Statement is part of 
a larger development, where international law is increasingly informalized, 
especially readmission agreements between the EU and third countries. 
Shaping an agreement in an informal manner is advantageous when an issue 
needs to be resolved quickly or when a cooperation is controversial. Turkey 
has historically had an instable relationship with Europe, and within the EU 
there was widespread opposition to cooperating. In addition, the EU had a 
strong need to quickly present a solution to the 'migrant crisis' in 2015. This 
solution became an undefinable agreement. 
 2 
Sammanfattning 
Den 18 mars 2016 publicerade Europeiska Rådet en överenskommelse på sin 
hemsida. Den blev känd som ’EU-Turkiet-avtalet’ och gick ut på att 
asylsökande skickas tillbaka från de grekiska öarna till Turkiet. I utbyte får 
Turkiet bl a ekonomisk kompensation och ökade chanser till visafrihet och 
EU-medlemskap.  
   Bland allmänheten möttes avtalet av kritik eftersom det överförde ansvaret 
för asylsökande till Turkiet, ett land med ett nyskapat asylsystem som ofta får 
kritik för brott mot mänskliga rättigheter. I diskussionerna bland jurister 
karaktäriserades avtalet istället av dess obestämbarhet. Överenskommelsen 
hade ingåtts av Europeiska Rådet i strid med fördragen och utan att inhämta 
Europaparlamentets godkännande. Ifall avtalet skulle vara bindande under 
folkrätten skulle det innebära att EU:s primärrätt om internationella avtal inte 
har respekterats. I februari 2017, när frågan skulle avgöras, fann Tribunalen 
istället att avtalet inte hade ingåtts av EU, utan av medlemsstaterna. 
Uttalandet möttes av skarp kritik. 
   I den här uppsatsen ges en djupgående förklaring av de här problemen 
genom att undersöka samspelet mellan juridiska och politiska faktorer. 
Texten tar upp olika argument för och emot ifall avtalet är bindande och ifall 
det är EU eller medlemsstaterna som är part till avtalet. Därefter undersöks 
hur avtalets icke-traditionella form gör det enklare för EU att undvika ansvar 
för dess ingående och konsekvenser. Sedan förklaras varför avtalet ser ut som 
det gör. Överenskommelsen är en del av en större utveckling, där mer och 
mer av folkrätten informaliseras, särskilt återvändandeavtal mellan EU och 
utomeuropeiska stater. Att ingå ett informellt avtal är dessutom särskilt 
fördelaktigt när problem snabba lösningar, eller när lösningen är 
kontroversiell. Turkiet har historiskt haft en ostadig relation till Europa och 
inom EU fanns ett starkt motstånd till samarbete. Dessutom hade EU ett 
behov av att snabbt presentera en lösning på ’flyktingkrisen’ 2015. Lösningen 
blev ett svårdefinierat avtal. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
 
After having been on the rise since 2010, the numbers of people applying for 
asylum in the EU increased sharply in spring 2015.1 Among the EU Member 
States, this development caused a sense of crisis. The influx of migrants was 
described as a ‘unprecedented pressure’2 and was used to legitimise the new 
EU migration package, the European Agenda of Migration (hereafter EAM). 
The EAM included several proposals on reforming the Common European 
Asylum System, along with extended cooperation with third countries 
regarding pushbacks and resettlements, usually combined with economic 
incentives.3 One such arrangement was the EU-Turkey Statement, released in 
March 2016, regulating the return of asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey.4  
   Most asylum seekers arriving in 2015 originated from Syria, Afghanistan 
and Iraq.5 Many had transited in Turkey before continuing to the EU. As a 
consequence of increased surveillance of land borders, and the sea crossing 
between Libya and Italy being a far more dangerous journey, the Eastern 
Mediterranean Route (across the Aegean Sea) became the most common 
point of entrance to the EU.6 There had been previous attempts to close this 
                                                 
1 Eurostat, Asylum applications (non-EU) in the EU-28 Member States, 2006–2017, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics (accessed 20 
April 2018). 
2 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council establishing an EU common list of safe countries of origin for the purposes of 
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on common 
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, and amending Directive 
2013/32/EU’ COM(2015) 452 final, section 1.1. 
3 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Investment Bank on 
establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda 
on Migration’ COM/2016/0385 final. 
4 European Council, EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016 (18 March 2016) 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ 
(accessed 15 May 2018). 
5 Eurostat, Asylum and new asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex, Annual 
aggregated data (rounded) and First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age 
and sex, Annual aggregated data (rounded), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 
(accessed 17 May 2018). 
6 European Stability Initiative, The Refugee Crisis Through Statistics, 30 January 2017, 
https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-
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route by readmission arrangement. In 2002, Greece and Turkey signed a 
bilateral agreement, the Greece-Turkey Readmission Protocol. However, the 
numbers of returned migrants under the Protocol were low. During the period 
2006-2012, only 10.1% of the requested readmissions were accepted by 
Turkey and only 3.1% were effectively returned. The responses to the 
requests were often delayed until the time-limits of the Protocol were 
exhausted, resulting in a cancellation of the request.7 In 2010 a joint statement 
was signed, holding that Turkey would accept 1000 requests per year. Despite 
this, the Protocol remained ineffective.8 
   In 2005, at the same time as the negotiations of Turkey’s accession into the 
EU began, a readmission agreement was drafted. In December 2013, the EU 
and Turkey signed the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement which entered into 
force in January 2014.9 Initially, the agreement only concerned readmission 
of Turkish nationals residing unauthorized in the EU Member States. It was 
expected to come into force regarding third country nationals as well in 
November 2017.10 However, following the EU-Turkey Statement, the Joint 
Readmission Committee, which was set up to facilitate the cooperation and 
monitor the implementation of the agreement, advanced this moment to June 
2016.11  
                                                 
%20The%20refugee%20crisis%20through%20statistics%20-%2030%20Jan%202017.pdf 
(accessed 15 May 2018), 13. 
7 Anna Triandafyllidou, Migration in Greece: Developments in 2013, Report prepared for 
the OECD Network of International Migration Experts, 13 November 2013 
http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Migration-in-Greece-Recent-
Developments-2013.pdf (accessed 23 April 2018), 11. 
8 Ibid, 12. 
9 Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission 
of persons residing without authorization [2014] OJ L134/3. 
10 Article 24(3) EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. 
11 Joint Readmission Council, Decision 2/2016 COM(2016) 72 final (Brussels, 2 October 
2016). Implemented by the Council by Council Decision (EU) 2016/551f 23 March 2016 
establishing the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union within the Joint 
Readmission Committee on a Decision of the Joint Readmission Committee on 
implementing arrangements for the application of Articles 4 and 6 of the Agreement 
between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons 
residing without authorisation from 1 June 2016, OJ L 95, 9 April 2016, 9–11  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016D0551 (accessed 23 April 
2018). On why this decision is null and void, see Nuray Ekşi ‘Readmission Agreement 
Between the European Union and Turkey: A Chain of Mistakes’ in International 
Community And Refugees: Responsibilities, Possibilities, Human Rights Violations (2016, 
Istanbul: Amnesty International Turkey), 163; Hemme Battjes and Orcun Ulusoy, Situation 
of Readmitted Migrants and Refugees from Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey 
Statement (Migration Law Series, 2017), 11. 
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   The EU-Turkey Statement was issued through a press release by the 
European Council on 18 March 2016. As the members of the European 
Council had negotiated with Turkey since October 2015, some kind of 
agreement was anticipated. The main purposes of the Statement were to 
‘break the business model of the smugglers’ and ‘end the irregular migration 
from Turkey to the EU’.12 It introduced several new obligations in the EU-
Turkey relations, although related to previous agreements and policy 
decisions. The Statement is composed of the following elements: 
a) The return of all irregular migrants, crossing from Turkey into Greek islands 
as from 20 March 2016. This should be carried out in full accordance with 
EU and international law. Migrants applying for asylum in Greece will have 
their applications assessed by the Greek authorities in cooperation with 
UNHCR. Those not applying for asylum or whose application is found 
inadmissible under EU law will be returned to Turkey. In case Turkey is 
found to be a third safe country for the asylum seeker, the application can be 
declared inadmissible.13 The costs of the returns will be covered by the EU 
and the returns will be carried out by Turkey and Greece, with assistance by 
EU institutions and agencies. 
b) For every Syrian national returned to Turkey, another Syrian national will 
be resettled in the EU. Priority will be given to Syrians who have not 
attempted to enter the EU irregularly. The UN Vulnerability Criteria will 
also be taken into account. This will be implemented by the Commission, 
other EU agencies, Member States and the UNHCR. 
c) Turkey will take ‘all necessary measures’ to prevent the opening of new sea 
or land routes from Turkey to the EU. 
d) The EU will allocate €6 billion to Turkey to fund refugee projects within the 
country. 
e) The parties will accelerate the visa liberalisation roadmap, with the aim of 
lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens vis-à-vis the Member 
States.  
                                                 
12 European Council, (n 4). 
13 Arts 33 and 38 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, 
[2013] OJ L180/60. 
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f) As soon as irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU have ended or 
have been sustainably and substantially reduced, a ‘Voluntary Humanitarian 
Admission Scheme’ will be activated. 
g) Turkey’s accession process to the EU will be re-energized. 
h) The EU, its Member States and Turkey will together improve the 
humanitarian conditions in Syria, in particular in the area close to the 
Turkish borders. 
 
1.2 Research Question, Terminology 
and Delimitation 
 
When writing this text, I was aiming for a broader understanding of the 
development at the EU’s external borders. The EU-Turkey Statement had 
been subjected to extensive debate, even since before it was completely 
concluded. There appeared to be a general disagreement on basic traits of the 
Statement, such as what the agreement was and who had concluded it. Partly, 
I wanted to go into the details of this discussion and get a more complete 
understanding of what it was about. Furthermore, I was driven by a disbelief 
that the lawyers of the EU or of the Member States would not be able to set 
up a legally clear agreement, regardless of whether they chose a political or a 
legal form. Consequently, there must be benefits of choosing a form which 
floats between the legal and the political, as well as between the EU and the 
Member States. In light of this, my thesis aims at answering the following 
question:  
 
Why does the EU-Turkey Statement have an unconventional form? 
 
The term ‘unconventional form’ refers to the aspects of the Statement that has 
been subjected to debate, i e whether the Statement is legally binding and 
whether it was entered by the EU or by the Member States. I consider the lack 
of clarity regarding these parts to make the Statement unconventional. As will 
be explained in detail in Chapter Three, the conclusion of the EU-Turkey 
 9 
Statement disregards traditional rules of treaty-making in relation to the 
procedure, the actors involved and the output.  
   In media and by the public, the Statement has in general been referred to as 
the ‘EU-Turkey Deal’. The EU institutions have used the terms ‘EU-Turkey 
Statement’ and, occasionally, ‘EU-Turkey Agreement’.14 In this thesis, I will 
use the term ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ since that is the wording used in the 
original press release. I will also refer to the EU-Turkey Statement as simply 
‘the Statement’ or sometimes ‘the Agreement’. 
   In relation to the release of the EU-Turkey Statement, and following the 
2015 migrant influx in general, there was a widespread misuse of terminology 
regarding the migrants that arrived in Europe. EU institutions and 
representatives repeatedly referred to people crossing the Aegean Sea as 
‘irregular migrants’, despite many needing international protection. When 
discussing the people affected by the EU-Turkey Statement, I will simply 
refer to them as ‘migrants’ or ‘migrants crossing the Aegean Sea’. This is not 
ideal since migrants with a Schengen visa may cross the Aegean Sea by ferry 
or by plane. However, as I do not wish to make any statements on the affected 
migrants’ potential right to international protection, I have to resort to a more 
general term. Furthermore, I wish to include both those who apply for asylum 
in Greece and those who choose not to. 
   This thesis will not consider whether the EU-Turkey Statement violates 
human rights law or not. That perspective has already been repeatedly 
examined by many others.15 I agree with the widespread opinion that the 
Statement is problematic for migrant protection and increases the risk of 
human rights violations. However, I believe this question needs to be 
examined by taking into account the actions of each state and the individual 
                                                 
14 ‘Statement’ used for example European Commission, First Report on the progress made 
in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement (Brussels, 20 April 2016) 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160420/report_implementation_eu-turkey_agreement_nr_01_en.pdf 
(accessed 26 April 2018). ‘Agreement’ used in European Commission, Fact sheet - 
Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement Questions and Answers (Brussels, 15 June 2016) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_en.htm (accessed 26 April 2018). 
15 Amnesty International, A Blueprint for Despair: Human Rights Impact of the EU-Turkey 
Deal (London, 2017); Human Rights Watch, EU: Returns to Greece Put Refugees at Risk  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/584e767b4.html (accessed 17 May 2018). 
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situation of each person. As the Member States are not under an obligation to 
exclude anyone from their territories, the Statement itself does not give rise 
to any human rights violations, even though it increases the possibilities to 
commit them. Rather, this thesis will focus on the legal technicalities that 
made it possible to conclude the EU-Turkey Statement, considering inter-
state relations and constitutional issues. This includes a human rights aspect 
concerning how the Statement’s legal form affects the access to legal 
remedies. Nevertheless, the Statement would have been problematic 
regardless of the current material conditions or procedural safeguards for 
asylum seekers in Turkey and Greece.16 
  
                                                 
16 On the situation in Greece, see Angeliki Dimitriadi, The Impact of the EU-Turkey 
Statement on Protection and Reception : The Case of Greece (Global Turkey in Europe No 
15, 2016) http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/impact-eu-turkey-statement-protection-and-
reception-case-greece (accessed 17 May 2018); François Crépeau, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on his mission to Greece A/HRC/35/25/Add.2 
(UN General Assembly, 2017). On the situation in Turkey, see Hemme Battjes and Orcun 
Ulusoy, Situation of Readmitted Migrants and Refugees from Greece to Turkey under the 
EU-Turkey Statement (Migration Law Series, 2017). 
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1.3 Disposition, Sources and 
Methodology 
 
Returning to the formulation of the research question, the use of the word 
‘why’ hints of something larger than what may be answered by a traditional 
legalistic approach. Indeed, this thesis is not written from a perspective of 
legal positivism. Rather, I draw on critical legal studies when authoring this 
text.17 The two elements of this school that will be most evident are: 
1. Law is not neutral, but is both a product of, and produces, politics and 
ideology. 
2. Legal proceedings are not primarily determined by legal provisions. 
This perspective, in particular the first point, is beneficial to this thesis since 
a central and reoccurring theme is the division between the legal and the 
political, or the legislative and the executive, and how the shift between these 
different sides occur. 
   Mainly, this thesis relies on primary sources. The most used material is 
legislation, documents issued by EU institutions and case law by international 
and EU courts, in particular in the second chapter which deals with strictly 
legal questions. Other types of sources are primarily found in the third 
chapter. Throughout the thesis, I rely on Treaty Law and Practice by Anthony 
Aust in order to present general perspectives on treaties and the procedure of 
concluding them. A disadvantage with this book is that it heavily reflects an 
Anglo-Saxon perspective on law, including the idea that the legal nature of 
an act is entirely dependent on the will of the concluding states. However, 
considering the subject of the thesis, I believe this standpoint poses a good 
contrast to the final analysis.  
   In Chapter Two, the legal nature of the EU-Turkey Statement will be 
explained. I have chosen to build this chapter on testing the following 
hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
17 For introduction to CLS, see for example Alan Hunt, ‘The 
Theory of Critical Legal Studies’ (1986) 6[1] Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1; Mark 
Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Harvard University Press, 1987); Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Harvard University Press: 1986). 
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The legal nature of the EU-Turkey Statement aims to divert the EU of accountability. 
 
I chose to use a hypothesis instead of a research question since Chapter Two 
is quite long and complex. A hypothesis is often more specific and less open 
than a question, and in this context it makes it easier to follow the reasoning. 
In order to examine the hypothesis, I need to outline answers to the following 
subquestions: 
a. What is the legal nature of the EU-Turkey Statement? 
b. How does it divert the EU of accountability? 
The main body of Chapter Two is divided into two sections. The first 
concerns who the parties are and the second whether the Statement is legally 
binding. In the first section, a central part will be the General Court order NF 
v European Council stating that the EU-Turkey Statement is not a product of 
the EU, but of all 28 Member States acting individually within the EU 
framework. My method for dealing with this case will reflect the second 
element of critical legal studies, on how the outcome of legal proceedings is 
shaped by other factors than law. After outlining the case, I will criticise the 
legal reasoning of the General Court. By doing so, I present an alternative 
interpretation which would have been equally feasible and more convincing. 
This follows my standpoint that law is not an exact science but shaped by 
legal-political interests. The consequence of presenting an alternative 
interpretation is that it reveals choice. If two legal interpretations are equally 
plausible, it cannot have been law that decided between these outcomes, but 
rather moral or political considerations. In general, I do not believe this 
reflects bad faith or a conscious will to shape law in a certain direction. 
However, in this case it is difficult to find any other explanation due to the 
very fragile legal argumentation.  
   The second issue, whether the Statement is legally binding under 
international law or not, is examined through a formal legal method. In this 
section, I present what definitions of a legally binding treaty that can be found 
in international law, turning to legal sources such as conventions and case law 
by the International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ) and International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (hereafter ITLOS). As the case law on this subject is 
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scarce, a selection has not been necessary to make. Thereafter, I attempt to 
answer whether the EU-Turkey Statement is a legally binding treaty by 
analyzing how well the elements of the Statement corresponds with the 
requirements. I also consider whether the Statement could be invalid due to 
the many complications of its entering. 
   As the two aspects of the EU-Turkey Statement are analyzed from a 
perspective of international law, the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties (hereafter VCLT I) will be central in the legal assessments of this 
chapter. Also, the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations (hereafter VCLT II) will be employed when relevant, such as 
when considering the EU as the party. The relationship between these 
instruments vis-à-vis the different parties and the status of the Statement will 
be discussed further in the beginning of Chapter Two. The chapter will also 
include assessments under EU primary law in order to understand the internal 
aspects of the treaty-making procedure, and how the EU considers its own 
external obligations. The issue of accountability will be assessed through EU 
primary law as well as international law. 
   In Chapter Three, I attempt to answer the original research question by 
taking a broader perspective on the conclusion of the agreement. In Chapter 
Two, it is asserted that the shape of the EU-Turkey Statement is beneficial 
since it serves EU interests without burdening the EU with accountability. In 
this next chapter, I wish to examine why this way was chosen for this 
particular agreement. Causality is a sensitive subject, and it is difficult to 
make statements on which development that led to which effect. However, in 
this chapter I chose to focus on the influence of three aspects that I consider 
to be most characteristic for the EU-Turkey Statement: 
1. It does not follow the traditional forms of treaty-making 
2. It was concluded between EU and Turkey 
3. It was concluded as a response to the 2015 migration ‘crisis’ 
Regarding the first aspect, I consider the trend of untraditional treaty-making 
in general. Here I consult research on the ongoing informalization of 
international law. Thereafter, I examine whether this trend is reflected in 
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recent EU readmission policies by relying on collections and systematizations 
of. EU readmission arrangements. When doing so, I find a clear division on 
the informalization trend between Western and orientalist or post-colonial 
countries. This leads me to the second aspect, the relationship between EU 
and Turkey. This part concerns in particular Turkey’s accession negotiations 
and visa liberalization roadmap, two important elements of the EU-Turkey 
Statement. In order to understand the EU-Turkey relationship, I turn to 
political science. I have attempted to pick out both European and Turkish 
authors in order to avoid a one-sided perspective. Regarding the third aspect, 
the 2015 migration crisis, I consider legal philosophy and political theory in 
order to understand the EU’s reaction. Over time, several philosophers and 
political theorists have written on the issue of sovereign responses to crisis. 
The main element that I use, the shift from legislative power to executive 
power as a safeguard for self-preservation, is reoccurring in several of these 
theories.  
   In order to analyse the relationship between the political landscape and the 
EU-Turkey Statement, I use Charles Lipson thorough article from 1991, Why 
are Some International Agreements Informal?.18 In his article, Lipson 
outlines four reasons to choose an informal agreement over a formal. In 
Chapter Three, I analyse how well these four reasons correspond to the EU’s 
situation, taking into account the three aspects described above. 
   In the fourth and final chapter, I summarise the findings I have made in this 
thesis and provide an answer to the research question. 
                                                 
18 Charles Lipson, ‘Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?’ (1991) 45[4] 
International Organization, 500. 
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2 The Legal Nature of the EU-
Turkey Statement 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Since the EU-Turkey Statement was released, it has been the focus point of 
widespread legal discussions. Initially, the debate only concerned whether it 
contained binding obligations under international law, or if the Statement was 
merely politically binding. The EU-Turkey Statement was, as its name 
indicates, generally considered to be an act attributable to the EU. However, 
in February 2017 the General Court of the EU issued three orders, turning this 
position on its head. The Court held that the Statement was not an EU act, but 
instead had been entered by the Member States. These orders were met with 
severe criticism and resulted in a second discussion, on whether the General 
Court’s findings were correct. 
   From a legal perspective, the most characteristic trait of the EU-Turkey 
Statement is its consistent lack of clarity. In this text I will argue that its 
current shape is not a result of mistakes. While it is precarious to make 
statements on the motivations of others, it appears unlikely that the lawyers 
of the EU would set up an agreement that could be binding as much as non-
binding, and attributable to the Member States as much as to the Union, due 
to lack of skill. Nevertheless, the discussions about the legal nature of the EU-
Turkey Statement seem never-ending. To lay bare the steps of my argument, 
I have formulated this as the following hypothesis: 
 
The legal nature of the EU-Turkey Statement aims to divert the EU of 
accountability. 
 
I have chosen the term ‘legal nature’ over for example ‘form’ in order to 
clarify that it is not only the text of the press release in itself that is important 
for the assessment. Other legally relevant factors, such as the context in which 
the agreement was concluded, will also be taken into consideration. 
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‘Accountability’ refers to the broad sense of the word. If the Statement is not 
legally binding, this would have consequences in three aspects. First, vis-à-
vis Turkey under international treaty law. Secondly, within the EU 
constitutional framework and for the relationships between the Member 
States, EU institutions and union citizens. Thirdly, towards the migrants 
crossing the Aegean Sea whose human rights risk being violated as a 
consequence of the Statement. 
   The main body of this chapter is divided into two sections. In the first, I will 
assess who may be considered the parties of the agreement (except for 
Turkey). That is, I will analyse whether the European Council, when 
concluding the agreement, was acting on behalf of the EU or of the Member 
States. Thereafter, I will outline what consequences the different answers may 
have under EU law and international law. The second part of the chapter 
focuses on the Statement’s potential status as a treaty. In this section I will 
examine whether the Statement may be considered legally binding under 
international law. Finally, I will return to the main hypothesis and make some 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.2 Application of the Vienna 
Conventions 
 
Before analyzing the legal nature, we need to consider how to assess the EU-
Turkey Statement under international law. Applying the VCLT I on this 
situation is complicated, since neither Turkey, the EU nor all of the EU 
Member States are parties to the Convention. Therefore, we need to clarify 
the effect of the VCLT I’s provisions depending on who is considered party 
to the EU-Turkey Statement. 
   If the Member States are the parties of the Statement, we may note that most 
of the states have ratified or acceded to VCLT I. However, two Member States 
(France and Romania) have not done so.19 Neither is Turkey party to the 
                                                 
19 See UN, United Nations Treaty Collection, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (accessed on 9 April 2018). 
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Convention.20 Therefore, in order to determine the scope of application it is 
necessary to consider to what extent the VCLT I reflects customary law. 
   116 states are currently parties to the VCLT I.21 Several of its articles have 
been found to reflect customary law by the ICJ. This includes the 
Convention’s definitions,22 rules of interpretation23 and rules of termination 
and suspension.24 Similar findings have been made by other international 
courts and tribunals.25 The ICJ has not yet issued a case where it holds that an 
article of the VCLT I does not reflect customary law.26 Since the creation of 
the Convention to a large extent was a codification of the practice between 
the drafting states, this is not surprising. In general, the articles used in this 
chapter reflect customary law. In case an article is not an evident part of 
customary law, this will be discussed in connection to the legal assessment. 
   Regarding the EU, the application of the VCLT I is even more difficult. The 
EU’s status as a legal persona was established through Article 47 of the 
Lisbon Treaty.27 It clarified that the Union holds legal personality and can 
have rights and assume obligations under international law. Thereby it can 
also enter agreements with third countries. The EU has often been described 
as sui generis under international law. The discussion of the EU’s legal nature 
falls outside the scope of this thesis, but the standpoints vary between 
considering it to be an international organisation, a federation of states or a 
supranational organisation.28 The provisions of the VCLT I are often explicit 
                                                 
20 20 See UN, United Nations Treaty Collection, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (accessed on 9 April 2018). 
21 Ibid. 
22 ICJ, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v 
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) (Judgment) ICJ Report 2002, 303, para 263. 
23 ICJ, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia) (Judgment) ICJ Report 1999, 1045. 
24 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory 
Opinion) ICJ Report 1971, 16. 
25 ITLOS, South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) (Award) CA Case No 2013-
19, 29 October 2015, 116, para 274; CJEU, case C-386/08, Brita v Hauptzollamt Hamburg 
Hafen [2010] EU:C:2010:91, para 42; ECtHR (Plenary), Golder v United Kingdom, App 
No 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975), para 29. 
26 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 13. 
27 Treaty of Lisbon, Amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community [2007] OJ C306/01. 
28 Joxerramon Bengoetxea ‘The EU as (More Than) an International Organization’ in Jan 
Klabbers and Åsa Wallendahl (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of International 
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on that they concern agreements between states. While being more than an 
international organisation, the EU is not a sovereign state. Since it is 
something in between, we need to examine instruments concerning treaties 
between states and international organisation to interpret customary law in 
this situation. Despite only being ratified by 32 states and 12 international 
organisations, and thereby not yet being into force, the most important 
instrument is the VCLT II.29  
   The VCLT II is the counterpart of VCLT I on treaties between several 
international organisations, or between one or more states and one or more 
international organisations.30 Most of its provisions are identical to the VCLT 
I, but occasionally the wordings differ. Therefore, the VCLT II can provide a 
wider understanding of how to assess treaties between states and international 
organisations.  
   The EU is not one of the organisations which have ratified the VCLT II. 
Moreover, the VCLT I is only open for signatures by states.31 Regarding its 
internal law, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter CJEU) has 
considered several of the VCLT I’s provisions to reflect customary law. 
According to the Court, these provisions form a part of the EU legal order and 
are thereby binding on all EU institutions.32 Regarding the VCLT II, the 
CJEU has applied several of its articles to agreements between the Union and  
third countries, though without explaining why it is applicable.33 
 
                                                 
Organizations (Northampton Publishing House 2011); Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Neither an 
International Organization Nor A Nation State: The EU as a Supranational Federation’ in 
Erik Jones, Anand Menon, and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the 
European Union (University of Pennsylvania, 2012). 
29 The Convention will enter into force when ratified by 35 states according to Article 85 of 
the VCLT II. For status of ratifications, see UN, United Nations Treaty Collection, Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
3&chapter=23&lang=en (accessed 9 April 2018). 
30 Article 1 of the VCLT II. 
31 Article 81 of the VCLT I. 
32 CJEU, case C-386/08, Brita v Hauptzollamt Hamburg Hafen EU:C:2010:91, para 42; see 
also case C-192/16 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, para 24, 45 and 46; case 
C-416/96 Eddline El-Yassini EU:C:1999:107, paragraph 47, and case C-268/99 Jany and 
Others, EU:C:2001:616, paragraph 35. 
33 CJEU, case C-327/91 France v Commission, EU:C:1994:305, para 25; see also the 
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro in the case, delivered on 16 December 1993, para 
12. 
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2.3 The Parties to the Statement 
 
During the first year of the EU-Turkey Statement, it was hardly up for 
discussion who its parties were.34 Considering the wording of the Statement 
and the context in which it was presented, it was assumed that Turkey had 
entered the agreement with the EU. However, in February 2017, the General 
Court issued three orders, holding that the Statement was an act of the 
Member States rather than the Union. This controversial finding makes it 
necessary to assess who may be considered a party under international law. 
   According to the hypothesis, the EU is the actual party to the Statement and 
should hold accountability for its creation and its consequences. In this 
section I will try this part of the hypothesis. After presenting the definition of 
a party under international law, I will move on to examine the legal reasoning 
of the General Court orders. Thereafter, I will present some legal and political 
consequences of the different standpoints. Finally, some concluding remarks 
will be made. 
 
 Becoming a Party 
In the VCLT I, the definition of ‘party’ is found in Article 2(1)(g). According 
to the article, ‘"[p]arty" means a State which has consented to be bound by 
the treaty and for which the treaty is in force’.35 The corresponding article of 
the VCLT II refers to ‘a State or international organization’ but is otherwise 
identical.36  
   The EU-Turkey Statement does not make any explicit statements on when 
it will enter into force. However, the implementation of its elements began on 
20 March 2015.37 The other requirement of the VCLT definition, consent to 
                                                 
34 For one of the few exceptions, see Enzo Cannizzaro ‘Disintegration through law?’ (2016) 
1[1] European Papers 3, 3. 
35 Italics added. 
36 Article 2(1)(g) of the VCLT II. 
37 Also, it makes no difference. If the Statement had not entered into force the EU or the 
Member States would have to be assessed under Article 2(1)(f) instead, which defines 
‘Contracting State’. A contracting state is simply a state which has consented to be bound, 
why the assessment would have been the same. When the treaty would have entered into 
force, it would have become legally binding for the state.  
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be bound, is a bit more complicated. As the Vienna Conventions are quite 
flexible on this point, there are several ways to express consent to be bound. 
The consent may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments 
constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.38 The 
mode of expression depends on the States involved in the treaty process and 
what types of expression they agree on. As such, several other ways to express 
consent has also been developed through state practice.39 
   Both the European Council and the Commission have claimed that no 
written agreement was concluded with Turkey on the 18 March 2016. 
Moreover, there is no public record of the discussions that took place. The 
NGO Access Info Europe has requested all documents generated or received 
by the Commission in relation to the legality of the EU-Turkey Statement.40 
This request was denied by the Commission, relying on the interest of 
protecting international relations.41 In a recent judgment, the General Court 
held that the Commission’s decision was correct with regard to almost all 
documents.42 It is therefore very difficult to determine how the consent to be 
bound may have been expressed in this case.  
   Against this background, the definition in the Vienna Conventions on how 
to enter an agreement does not bring us any closer to an answer. However, it 
is clear that an agreement, regardless of its legal status, was entered by the 
Heads of State or Government of the EU Member States with Turkey on 18 
March 2016. The central question is whether they, at the time, were acting as 
representatives of their own states or as the European Council. In the 
following section this will be examined, taking the orders of the General 
Court as a point of departure. Thereafter, the Court’s findings will be 
criticized from perspectives of EU law and international law. Finally, 
                                                 
38 Articles 11-17 of the VCLT I. 
39 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Consent to Be Bound – Anything New under the Sun?’ (2005) 
74[3] Nordic Journal of International Law 483, 484f. 
40 Ask the EU, Legal advice and/or analysis of the legality on EU-Turkey agreements, 17 
March 2016  
https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/legal_advice_andor_analysis_of_t_2#outgoing-5620 
(accessed 9 April 2018) 
41 Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents [2001] OJ L 145/43. 
42 Case T-852/16 Access Info Europe v Commission, EU:T:2018:71. 
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different problems and consequences that arise depending on who the party 
is will be outlined.  
 
 The General Court’s Orders 
2.3.2.1 Action for Annulment 
First, a few words on the procedure of the General Court orders. The 
applicants were bringing actions for annulment of the EU-Turkey Statement 
under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(hereafter TFEU). In this procedure, the General Court is empowered to 
review the legality of acts by EU Institutions intended to produce legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties.43 In case the agreement infringes a procedural 
requirement or a rule of law, the General Court can declare the act to be 
void.44 Any legal or natural person may initiate proceedings against an act, as 
long as it is of direct and individual concern to them. General Court orders 
concerning annulment may be appealed to the CJEU, but only on points of 
law.45 It is important to note that the EU courts only have jurisdiction over 
EU acts, not international agreements with third parties. Therefore, an 
annulment by the CJEU or the General Court could only render the EU 
decision to enter the agreement void, not the international agreement in itself. 
The agreement would still be valid under international law.46 
 
2.3.2.2 NF v European Council 
Moving on the actual orders; on 28 February 2017, the General Court issued 
three orders with almost identical legal reasoning, NF, NG and NM v 
European Council.47 All applicants were migrants who had arrived to Greece 
from Turkey and were at risk of being returned. In this section, we will take 
                                                 
43 Case C-28/12 Commission v Council, EU:C:2015:282, para 14; joined cases C-181/91 
and C-248/91 Parliament v Council and Commission, EU:C:1993:271, para 13; case 
C-27/04 Commission v Council, EU:C:2004:436, para 44.  
44 Art 264 TFEU. 
45 Art 256(1) TFEU. 
46 CJEU, joined cases C-103/12 and C-165/12 Parliament v Commission, EU:C:2014:2400, 
para 91.   
47 Case T-192/16 NF v European Council EU:T:2017:128; case T-193/16 NG v European 
Council EU:T:2017:129; case T-257/16 NM v European Council EU:T:2017:130. 
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a closer look at NF. In the case, NF claimed that the EU-Turkey Statement 
was an unlawful act, both in relation to Article 218 TFEU and to the human 
rights of the concerned migrants, as regulated in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (hereafter the Charter). Under Article 218 
TFEU, international agreements should be negotiated by the Council and the 
Commission, not the European Council.48 Even more important, entering a 
readmission agreement requires consent by the European Parliament, 
something that was not requested in this case.49 The European Council 
responded by requesting the Court to declare the plea inadmissible since no 
agreement or treaty had been concluded between Turkey and the EU.50  
   The European Council argued that the meeting that took place on 18 March 
2016 was between Turkey and the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States of the EU, not the European Council. That is, during the 
meeting with Turkey, the Heads of State or Government were not acting as 
the European Council, but as representants of 28 different states which were 
all members of the EU.51 Consequently, the General Court had no jurisdiction. 
The applicant responded to this argument by pointing out that the Statement 
repeatedly mentions an agreement between Turkey and EU, rather than the 
Member States.52 
   The main issue of the case was to determine whether the group of people 
which met with Turkey on 18 March 2016 was acting in capacity of the 
European Council or not. The Court recalled that the meeting was preceded 
by two other meetings, on 29 November 2015 and 7 March 2016. However, 
the press releases of these meetings both clearly stated that they took place 
between Turkey and the Heads of State or Government. This differed from 
the press release from 18 March 2016 in which the terms ‘EU’ or ‘European 
Council’ were consistently used. The European Council explained this by 
claiming that the press release of 18 March 2018 contained journalistic 
simplifications in order to address the general public. The General Court 
                                                 
48 Art 218 TFEU. On the role of the European Council, see Art 15 TEU. 
49 Art 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU. On regulation of entering readmission agreements, see Article 
79(2) TFEU. 
50 Case T-192/16 NF v European Council EU:T:2017:128, para 27. 
51 Ibid, para 28. 
52 Ibid, para 32.  
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found this explanation reasonable and also held that the expressions ‘EU’ and 
‘Members of the European Council’ are ambiguous terms.53 
   The Court then continued to examine the documents of the 18 March 2016 
and found that the meeting consisted of two parallel events. One was held 
between the Heads of State and Government and Turkey while the other was 
with the European Council. These meetings were considered different in a 
legal, formal and organisational perspective, but took place on the same day 
and in the same building, due to reasons of costs, security and efficiency.54 
This was also indicated by the invitations for the meetings as well as a pdf 
version of the EU-Turkey Statement, submitted by the European Council in 
the proceedings. The General Court noted that both the President of the 
European Council and the President of the Commission were present during 
the meeting between the Member States and Turkey, but this did not allow 
for any other conclusion.55 Since the Statement was not considered an EU act, 
the General Court dismissed the action without making a finding on whether 
the Statement constitutes a legally binding treaty or merely a political 
arrangement.56 The orders were appealed on 21 April 2017 and is currently 
pending before the CJEU. 
 
2.3.2.3 Critique of the Case 
The reasoning by the General Court is not very convincing and leaves us with 
several unsolved issues. It was very unexpected that the Court would consider 
the Statement attributable to the Member States rather than the European 
Council. As an example, just one month before the General Court declared 
the case inadmissible, the European Ombudsman issued a decision where 
they found that the Statement, regardless of whether it was legally binding, 
had been entered by the European Council.57  
                                                 
53 Case T-192/16 NF v European Council EU:T:2017:128, para 61. 
54 Ibid, para 63. 
55 Ibid, paras 67-68. 
56 Ibid, para 71. 
57 European Ombudsman, Decision of the European Ombudsman in the joint inquiry into 
complaints 506-509-674-784-927-1381/2016/MHZ against the European Commission 
concerning a human rights impact assessment in the context of the EU-Turkey Agreement, 
18 January 2017, para 26. 
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   The concept brought forward by the European Council and the Commission 
might appear radical. However, the idea of the 28 Member States working 
through the framework of the European Council is not new in itself. A similar 
arrangement was also conducted in relation to the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement in 2016. Following a referendum in the Netherlands, Dutch 
politicians refused to ratify the Agreement, causing diplomatic issues within 
the European Council. The solution was to avoid adopting a declaration or a 
protocol, but instead a ‘Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the 
28 Member States of the European Union, meeting within the European 
Council’.58 Also here, the decision was taken within the framework of the 
European Council, but did not require a legal basis in EU law.59 According to 
the Legal Counsel of the European Council, this method has been used in the 
same situation previously, in December 1992 and in June 2009.60 Similar 
arrangement have also been brought before the CJEU, for example in C-28/12 
Commission v Council and C-22/70 Commission v Council. However, in both 
cases, the CJEU considered the acts to be attributable to EU institutions. 
   Moving on to the case at hand, the European Council’s explanation on using 
the term ‘EU’ when actually referring to the Member States due to journalistic 
simplification is quite original. First, one might question how often the 
general public reads the European Council’s press releases. Secondly, how 
many of those that do that are unable to understand the difference between 
the EU and its Member States. Thirdly, it is not clear how this would be made 
easier by using an incorrect term. In case the word ‘EU’ actually refers to the 
Member States, wordings such as ‘The EU and its Member States’ which can 
be found in the Statement, becomes difficult to explain. It is also questionable 
                                                 
58 ‘Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the 28 Member States of the European 
Union, meeting within the European Council, on the Association Agreement between the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of 
the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part’. Annexed to European Council, European 
Council Conclusions on Ukraine (15 December 2016), 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24151/15-euco-conclusions-ukraine.pdf (accessed 
17 May 2018). 
59 Ramses A Wessels, ‘The EU Solution to Deal with the Dutch Referendum Result on the 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement’ (2016) 1[3] European Papers 1305, 1306. 
60 European Council, Opinion of the Legal Counsel, EUCO 37/16 (Brussels, 12 December 
2016) http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15-2016-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 17 
May 2018). 
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why it would be necessary to shift between using the terms ‘EU’ and ‘the 
Member States’ if they refer to the same thing. 
   On the same note, the General Court seems to disregard the difference 
between the wording used in relation to the actors. When the Member States 
or the members of the European Council is mentioned, their role is 
consistently passive. They ‘welcome’ the Commission’s proposal and they 
‘will contribute on a voluntary basis’ to the Voluntary Humanitarian 
Admission Scheme. In comparison, the EU ‘will’ cover costs and mobilise 
additional funding. It is also the EU that has ‘agreed’, ‘decided’ and 
‘reconfirmed [its] commitment’. In case the Member States only contributes 
on a voluntary basis, it is difficult to understand who it is that ‘will’ activate 
the Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme. 
   Moreover, the General Court noticed the two meetings held on 29 
November 2015 and 7 March 2016 and accepted the argument that ‘EU’ is a 
journalistic simplification, but disregarded publications of other meetings. 
For example, in the memo of the meeting of 15 October 2015 which describes 
what has been agreed ad referenda on the progress of setting up a Joint Action 
Plan, the plan is claimed to have ‘two parties’, the EU and Turkey.61 This plan 
was later activated on the Statement of 29 November 2015 and reconfirmed 
in the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016. The meeting of 15 October 
2015 was, according to press releases of that day and the Statement of 29 
November 2015, clearly a meeting of the European Council.62 Also in a later 
Commission Decision,  which is an official document without journalistic 
simplifications, the Joint Action Plan is described as ‘the understanding 
between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey’.63 
   The General Court also appears to disregard previous case law. One 
example is Parliament v Council and Commission, which is a very similar 
                                                 
61 European Commission, EU-Turkey joint action plan, 15 October 2015, MEMO/15/5860, 
part I. 
62 European Council, Meeting of the EU heads of state or government with Turkey 
(Brussels, 29 November 2016) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-
summit/2015/11/29/ (accessed 17 May 2018). 
63 European Commission, Decision of 10 February 2016 on the Facility for Refugees in 
Turkey amending Commission Decision C(2015) 9500 of 24 November 2015 (2016/C 
60/03), preamble 2. 
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case to the one at hand.64 The Member States, meeting as the Council, had 
decided to grant aid to Bangladesh. The decision had been written down in 
meeting minutes and its implementation was going to be coordinated by the 
Commission. When the Parliament brought an action for annulment before 
the Court, the Council plead the Court to declare the case inadmissible on 
grounds that the contested act was not an act of the Council but of the Member 
States. In this case, the CJEU stated that the form or description of an act is 
irrelevant for the question who its originator is. Rather, ‘[i]n order for such an 
act to be excluded from review, it must still be determined whether, having 
regard to its content and all the circumstances in which it was adopted, the act 
in question is not in reality a decision of the Council.’65 Similar findings were 
made in Commission v Council, where the Court held that ‘[a]n action for 
annulment must therefore be available in the case of all measures adopted by 
the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are intended to have 
legal effects’.66 This implies that the General Court should have begun its 
assessment by determining the effects of the Statement. 
   In both these cases, the CJEU assessed whether the agents were acting in 
EU capacity by considering the division of competence between the EU and 
the Member States. In NF v European Council, the General Court seems to 
regard the European Council’s constitution to be a result of coincidences. We 
will therefore take a closer look at the division of competence between the 
EU and the Member States on this matter.67 To begin with, the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, which includes migration, is a field in which 
competence is shared between the EU and the Member States.68 The 
competence on entering international agreements is regulated through 
Articles 2(2), 3(2) and 216(1) TFEU. While Member States may enter 
                                                 
64 Joined cases C-181/91 and C-248/91, Parliament v Council and Commission 
EU:C:1993:271. 
65 Ibid, para 14.  
66 Case C-22/70, Commission v Council, EU:C:1971:32, para 42. 
67 See for example Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘Denialism as the Supreme Expression of Realism – A 
Quick Comment on NF v European Council’ (2017) 2 European Papers 251. In the 
following paragraphs I rely on the findings of Paula Garcia Andrade, ‘EU External 
Competences in the Field of Migration: How to Act Externally When Thinking Internally’ 
55[1] Common Market Law Review, 157. 
68 Article 4(2)(j) TFEU, see also Art 79(3) TFEU on readmission agreements 
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international agreements by virtue of their sovereignty, this right is regulated 
for the EU in Article 216(1) TFEU. It holds that the EU may enter into 
international agreements in accordance with the Treaties, when it is necessary 
‘in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the 
objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding 
Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope’. Such 
agreements are then binding on the Member States as well as all EU 
institutions. According to Article 2(2) TFEU, when a competence is shared, 
Member States may only exercise their competence to the extent that the EU 
has not done so, or where the EU has ceased to exercise this competence. This 
is further specified by Article 3(2) TFEU, which codifies the ERTA doctrine 
laid down by the CJEU in 1971.69 The case concerned an international 
agreement entered by six Member State which was incompatible with EU 
regulations. The CJEU then held: 
 
In particular, each time the Community, with a view to implementing a 
common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down 
common rules, whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer 
have the right, acting individually or even collectively, to undertake 
obligations with third countries which affect those rules. 
 
As and when such common rules come into being, the Community alone is in 
a position to assume and carry out contractual obligations towards third 
countries affecting the whole sphere of application of the Community legal 
system.70 
 
In other words, when the EU legislates in an area with concurrent 
competence, the Member States lose their competence over that area. Before 
an international agreement is entered, the competence is still shared. 
However, when an agreement with a third country is signed, the Member 
                                                 
69 Case C-22/70, Commission v Council, EU:C:1971:32,. The doctrine was later refined in 
several cases, e g case C-467/98 Commission v Denmark EU:C:2002:625; case C-476/98; 
Commission v Germany EU:C:2002:631. 
70 Case C-22/70, Commission v Council, EU:C:1971:32, paras 17-18. 
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States may no longer enter into bilateral agreements with that third country 
on the same issue.71 
   The EU-Turkey Statement contains several elements which are covered by 
EU legislation. For example, the procedure to determine inadmissibility is 
carried out under the Directive on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (Asylum Procedures Directive).72 Also, 
obligations regarding the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap for Turkish citizens 
should be done in accordance with the Regulation establishing a Community 
Code on Visas.73 When the EU entered the EU-Turkey Readmission 
Agreement in 2013, a concurrent competence became an exclusive 
competence. This is stressed by Article 21 of the agreement, which holds that 
the new agreement takes precedence over previous bilateral agreements 
between Turkey and the Member States as far as they are incompatible. The 
role of the Member States is limited to drawing up implementation 
protocols.74 As the competence becomes exclusive from the moment of 
signature, this is not affected by the three-year delay in applying the 
agreement on third country national.75 While Article 18(7) holds that 
‘Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the return of a person under other 
formal or informal arrangements’, this only allows previously entered 
agreement, such as the Greece-Turkey Readmission Protocol.76  
   To summarize, according to the ERTA doctrine and EU primary law, the 
competence on entering readmission agreements with Turkey lies entirely 
with the EU. If the General Court had applied the reasoning established in 
Parliament v Council and Commission, it would have found the EU-Turkey 
Statement to be an EU act. This is also indicated by other circumstances of 
the Statement’s conclusion, such as previous meetings and documents. 
                                                 
71 Andrade (n 67) 170f. 
72 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. 
73 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). 
74 Article 20 EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. 
75 Andrade (n 67), 195. 
76 Ibid. 
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Besides internal law, EU institutions also has to follow international 
customary law in its relations to third countries.77 Relevant legislation on 
attribution can be found in Article 7(3) of the VCLT II, which states: 
 
A person is considered as representing an international organization for the 
purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, or expressing the 
consent of that organization to be bound by a treaty, if: 
(a) that person produces appropriate full powers; or 
(b) it appears from the circumstances that it was the intention of the States 
and international organizations concerned to consider that person as 
representing the organization for such purposes, in accordance with the rules 
of the organization, without having to produce full powers. 
 
This may be divided into one internal and one external requirement. What is 
important is that the person, organ or agent was (1) connected to the 
organisation, and (2) appeared to be representing the organisation when 
entering the agreement.78 This also follows from ICJ case law. In its advisory 
opinion on Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United 
Nations the Court considered the issue of attribution for the actions of UN 
agents. The ICJ then held: 
 
The Court understands the word ‘agent’ in the most liberal sense, that is to say, 
any person who, whether a paid official or not, and whether permanently 
employed or not, has been charged by an organ of the organization with 
                                                 
77 This has been acknowledged by the CJEU (n 32). However, the CJEU has also indicated 
that the EU is not bound by international law, see e g joined cases C-402/05 P and C-
415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission 
EU:C:2008:461; Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454. 
78 In case the agreement entered was not legally binding, the issue of attribution cannot be 
assessed under the VCLT II, since it is only applicable to treaties.  However, regardless of 
the agreement’s legal status, the Draft Articles of Responsibility of International 
Organizations (hereafter IO Articles) may be considered by analogy.  The subject of 
attribution can be found in Article 6, which states: 
“1. The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the performance of 
functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of that organization under 
international law, whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization.  
2. The rules of the organization apply in the determination of the functions of its organs and 
agents. 
In both the definitions of the VCLT II and the IO Articles, the actual function of the agents 
according to internal rules is downplayed.” 
Again, what is important is how the actor, if connected to the organization, appeared 
externally. 
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carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its functions – in short, any person 
through whom it acts.79 
 
As argued by Enzo Cannizzaro, the EU-Turkey Statement was negotiated by 
the Presidents of the two organs entrusted with the international 
representation of the EU – the European Council and the Commission. 
Moreover, the meeting took place in the headquarters of the European 
Council and its outcome was posted on the European Council’s website. Since 
it must have appeared to Turkey as if the Heads of State or Government was 
acting as the European Council, the EU-Turkey Statement should be 
considered an act attributable to the EU.80 From this perspective, the General 
Court could have chosen to base their reasoning on how the conclusion of the 
EU-Turkey Statement appeared for third parties, rather than the intentions of 
the EU institutions. 
   As shown above, there are several flaws in the General Court’s reasoning 
as well as alternative interpretations which have not been considered. The 
General Court could easily have chosen other outcomes but decided to reach 
its current decision by complicated and far-fetched reasoning. According to 
Thomas Spijkerboer, the Court’s ruling can be explained primarily by a desire 
to avoid the legal and political consequences of reaching any other outcome. 
If the Statement had been attributable to the EU, the Court would have been 
forced to take a stance on possible human rights violations. In case the Court 
would have found the Statement incompatible it would have to annul it, 
possibly causing an ‘explosive political situation’.81 If the Statement is not an 
EU act, this also blocks all future attempts by the Greek Courts to refer 
preliminary questions on the Statement to the CJEU. Another option for 
avoiding a judgment on human rights law would have been to consider the 
Statement to be a political agreement rather than legally binding. This would 
have required a narrow interpretation of the action for annulment, possibly 
                                                 
79 ICJ Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (Advisory 
Opinion), ICJ Reports 1949, 177. 
80 Cannizzaro (n 67) 256. 
81 Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Bifurcation of Mobility, Bifurcation of Law. Externalization of 
Migration Policy Before the EU Court of Justice’ in Journal of Refugee Studies 
(forthcoming) 9. 
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limiting the Court’s future jurisdiction. The reasoning of the orders is very 
factual, and the specific details of the case are decisive. Thereby, it has low 
precedential value and will probably not limit the Court’s jurisdiction in the 
future.82  
 
 Consequences of Different Standpoints 
The Member States are currently considered the legal parties to the 
agreement. Nevertheless, the EU is still taking political credit for the 
Statement.83 In order to try the hypothesis, the following section will explain 
how the issue of accountability is affected depending on whether the EU or 
the Member States are the parties. I will outline what the consequences are of 
these positions under different constitutional frameworks and show why 
neither of them are ideal. 
 
2.3.3.1 The EU as the Party 
If the General Court would have found the Statement to be attributable to the 
EU, it would have moved on to examine whether the Statement had legal 
effects. If that had been the case, the Court would have to make a decision on 
whether the agreement was entered in accordance with the TFEU and whether 
it is a violation of the Charter.  
   The applicants could have brought objections regarding the European 
Council’s competence under primary law to bind the EU to international 
agreements. International agreements have to be concluded in accordance 
with Article 218 TFEU. The article outlines how the EU enters international 
agreements and contains several requirements which were not met in this 
case. To begin with, the European Council does not hold legislative powers 
or powers to enter international agreements on behalf of the EU with third 
parties.84 As a consequence, it is not mentioned in the article. Instead, the 
                                                 
82 82 Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Bifurcation of Mobility, Bifurcation of Law. Externalization of 
Migration Policy Before the EU Court of Justice’ in Journal of Refugee Studies 
(forthcoming), p 10. 
83 European Commission, (n 14) 2. 
84 Art 15 TEU. 
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procedure to negotiate and enter international agreements should be carried 
out by the Council and the Commission. Both institutions were involved in 
the meeting surrounding the EU-Turkey agreement but claim they were 
merely preparing and administrating the meetings. It is difficult to ascertain 
their involvement since the transparency surrounding the negotiations is very 
limited. Regardless, the European Parliament has to approve of some kinds 
of international agreements in order for them to be legally concluded under 
EU law.85 This includes agreements which cover fields for which the ordinary 
legislation procedure applies, such as readmission agreements.86 When 
negotiating with Turkey, no institutions asked for this approval. Moreover, 
the European Parliament should have been informed of the procedure at its 
every step.87 Since the procedure was not respected, entering an international 
agreement with Turkey through the Statement would violate Article 13(2) 
TEU, which is reason for annulling the act.  
   Secondly, the applicants could have claimed that the agreement was 
incompatible with the Charter. Several human rights organisations have 
expressed concerns regarding the principle of non-refoulement and the 
prohibition of collective expulsions.88 As the EU is not a Contracting State of 
the ECHR, a procedure before the CJEU is the only way to legally assess 
whether acts of its institutions are in accordance with human rights 
standards.89 Since Greece and Turkey are Contracting States to the ECHR, 
migrants affected by the Statement (as implemented by Greek and Turkish 
authorities) may still appeal to the ECtHR regarding their treatment, under 
certain circumstances.90 However, there is a major difference between the 
Strasbourg and Luxemburg Courts. The ECtHR is only empowered to find 
                                                 
85 Art 218(6)(a) TFEU. 
86 Art 218(6)(a)(v) TFEU. On regulation of entering readmission agreements, see Article 
79(2) TFEU. 
87 Art 218(10) TFEU. 
88 See Art 4 and Art 19(1) of the Charter. For human rights concerns, see Amnesty (n 15); 
Human Rights Watch (n 15). 
89 CJEU, Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, EU:C:2014:2454 
90 See Article 35 ECHR on admissibility. The ECtHR has ruled on the Statement in JR and 
others v Greece App No 22696/16 (ECtHR, 25 January 2018, appealed to GC) but did not 
find a violation. JB v Greece App No 54796/16 (ECtHR, communicated on 18 May 2017) 
is currently pending. 
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violations in the application of a given legal instrument. It cannot render a 
legal act invalid in itself the way the General Court and the CJEU can. 91 
 
2.3.3.2 The Member States as the Parties 
As shown above, the Member States have delegated the competence of 
concluding readmission agreements with Turkey to the EU. In case the 
Member States are parties to the Statement, this would mean that they have 
intruded on an exclusive area of competence. This is problematic regardless 
of whether the EU-Turkey Statement is legally binding or not.92 If the 
Member States disregard the EU’s exclusive competence they may be 
breaching several fundamental principles of the EU legal order, including the 
principle of conferral of powers and the duty of loyal cooperation.93 
Moreover, it is remarkable that the Commission has not reacted to this, but 
instead facilitated the conclusion of the agreement. This is in stark contrast to 
its assigned role as guardian of the treaties.94  
   In case the Statement is considered legally binding, this would also raise 
issues under each Member States’ domestic constitutional frameworks.95 In 
most democracies, parliamentary approval is required when entering a treaty. 
It does not seem like parliamentary approval has been given to the EU-Turkey 
Statement in any of the 28 Member States. What effect an unlawful entering 
of an international agreement may have under domestic law depends on each 
state’s constitutional framework. A complete review of this is outside the 
scope of this thesis. However, the orders by the General Courts and the 
possibility that an international agreement has been entered by the states 
appears to have received very little attention.  
                                                 
91 Martin Kuijer, ‘Fundamental rights protection in the legal order of 
the European Union’ in Adam Łazowski and Steven Blockmans (eds) Research Handbook 
on EU Institutional Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2016) 225. 
92 Case C-233/02 France v Commission EU:C:2004:173, para 40. 
93 Arts 5(2) and 4(3) TEU. 
94 Art 17 TEU. 
95 Note that in JR and Others v Greece (n 90) the ECtHR appears to imply that the EU-
Turkey Statement is a treaty. It is repeatedly referred to as ‘un accord’ and the Strasbourg 
Court claims that Greece had to follow the agreement (’À la suite de la « Déclaration UE-
Turquie », il a fallu réviser immédiatement le fonctionnement des centres d’accueil et 
d’enregistrement…’, para 41). 
 34 
   Assuming the Member States and Turkey are the only parties to the 
Statement, and assuming the Statement is legally binding, the next issue is to 
understand the role of EU institutions under the Statement. EU institutions 
are in several ways involved in the readmission procedure. Greek authorities 
are assisted in assessing asylum applications by EASO and with the 
readmissions by the European Border and Coast Guard. The progress of 
implementing the Statement is monitored and reported by the Commission. 
Of the €3 billion initially allocated to Turkey through the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey, €1 billion is from the EU budget and the other €2 billion 
from the Member States.96 The Facility for Refugees is a coordination of both 
the EU’s and the Member States’ actions.97 The decisions on which projects 
to fund is taken by the Steering Committee which is chaired by the 
Commission and composed of one representative of each Member State and 
two representatives of the Commission.  
   Regardless of whether the decisions to allocate funds and implement the 
Statement are taken by the EU or the Member States, the issue at hand is 
whether the EU is bound to do so. That is, whether states can confer 
obligations on an international organisation of which they are members. As 
previously mentioned, the EU is an independent legal persona under 
international law. It is an ancient general principle of law that an agreement 
cannot create rights or obligations for third parties without their consent.98 
This has also been codified in the Vienna Conventions.99 While the VCLT I 
only protects third states from being bound, this protection is extended to third 
international organisations in the VCLT II.  
   However, this practice is not entirely uncommon. One example is Article 
83 of the VCLT I which designates the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations as the depositor of all relevant instruments of accession, without a 
                                                 
96 European Commission (n 63) para 2. See also joined cases C-181/91 and C-248/91 
Parliament v Council and Commission, EU:C:1993:271, para 24, on how decisions 
concerning the Union’s budget affects the cathegorisation of the act. 
97  European Commission (n 63) para 2; Commission Decision of 24 November 2015 on the 
coordination of the actions of the Union and of the Member States through a coordination 
mechanism — the Refugee Facility for Turkey (2015/C 407/07). 
98 Pacta tertiis nec prosunt nec nocent under Roman law. 
99 Arts 34-36 of the VCLT I and the VCLT II. 
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clear legal ground.100 Our situation differs from the one of the VCLT I in one 
important aspect. While only 116 of the 193 UN Members are parties to the 
VCLT I, all of the EU Member States are parties to the EU-Turkey Statement. 
It would therefore be possible to argue that the EU has been bound through 
consensus. The EU does, after all, only consist of its Member States and can 
only exercise the power they have transferred. Another option is Article 35 of 
the VCLT II, which states: 
 
An obligation arises for a third State or a third organization from a provision 
of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of 
establishing the obligation and the third State or the third organization 
expressly accepts that obligation in writing. 
 
In case we consider Commission decisions of 24 November 2015 and 10 
February 2016 on establishing the Facility for Refugees in Turkey to be an 
act of the EU, we might conclude that the EU has accepted to take up 
responsibilities with regard to the EU-Turkey Statement. 
   The problem with both these arguments lies in the second sentence of 
Article 35 of the VCLT II. It states that ‘[a]cceptance by the third organization 
of such an obligation shall be governed by the rules of that organization’. The 
EU has a framework in place in order to ensure democratic legitimacy. If we 
accept that the Member States could bind the EU by consensus, it would 
enable the European Council to side-track the constitutional procedures set 
out in the treaties. As a consequence, the EU has no obligation to implement 
the EU-Turkey Statement. 
 
 Conclusion 
In this section I have shown that the reasoning of the General Court in NF v 
European Council was flawed. Other outcomes would have been more legally 
feasible, but the constitutional consequences would have been worse. If the 
                                                 
100 Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Organizations as Third Parties under the Law of 
International Treaties’ in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed) The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna 
Conventions (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 217. 
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General Court had found the EU-Turkey Statement to be attributable to the 
EU, they could also have found the Statement to violate human rights and the 
EU constitutional framework. As long as the Member States are the parties, 
the main issue is the absence of parliamentary consent, in case the Statement 
is legally binding. On the EU level, there has also been a breach of 
competence. However, this violation can only lead to an infringement action, 
which the Commission has no interest in initiating.  
   Returning to the hypothesis, this section has shown that the EU should be 
considered the party to the EU-Turkey Statement, rather than the Member 
States. Attributing the Statement to the Member States is one of two ways in 
which the EU attempts to avoid accountability for the Statement. In the next 
section, we will consider the other way: the legally binding nature of the 
Statement. 
 
 
2.4 Is the Statement Legally Binding? 
 
When the EU-Turkey Statement was released, a debate emerged on whether 
it could be a treaty under international law, and thereby legally binding for 
the parties. This is the second aspect in which the Statement deviates from the 
formalities of international law. In order to assert whether the EU should be 
considered accountable for the Statement, we need to examine whether the 
agreement is legally binding. Under international law, this is primarily 
relevant in relation to Turkey. Within the EU, the agreement’s legal nature 
decides whether parliamentary consent was required for its conclusion and 
whether the decision to enter the agreement can be annulled by the CJEU. 
   This section begins by outlining the definition of a treaty under international 
law. The requirements are then applied to the EU-Turkey Statement in order 
to examine whether it is legally binding. Thereafter, I examine whether the 
Statement could be invalid under international law due to the deficiencies of 
its conclusion.  
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 Is the Statement a Treaty? 
2.4.1.1 Definition of a Treaty 
In order to analyse the legal status of the EU-Turkey Statement, we need to 
define what a treaty is. One definition can be found in Article 2(1)(a) of the 
VCLT I: 
 
"Treaty" means an international agreement concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation. 
 
The ICJ has considered this definition to reflect customary law.101 
Nevertheless, this is only one definition. It is not exhaustive for treaties under 
international law.102 Consequently, if an agreement falls within the definition 
of Article 2(1)(a), it is a treaty. If it does not meet the requirements of the 
article, it may still be considered a treaty. 
   From the definition of Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT I, four requirements can 
be crystalized. The agreement has to be international, concluded between 
states, in written form and be governed by international law. The article also 
clarifies that the designation of the agreements or the number of instruments 
it is divided on is irrelevant. In the following section, these requirements will 
be applied to the EU-Turkey Statement in order to assess its legal status. 
 
2.4.1.2 Application to the EU-Turkey Statement 
To begin with, the requirement of the treaty to be written is clearly met in the 
case of the EU-Turkey Statement.103 Secondly, the agreement should have an 
international character. This requirement is rather superfluous as it can 
mainly be assessed by considering the other requirements.104 Nevertheless, 
the EU-Turkey Statement is an agreement between international actors. 
                                                 
101 ICJ (n 22), para 263. 
102 See for example Article 3 of the VCLT I, concerning non-written agreements. 
103 However, if the agreement had been oral, it would not have been any less valid as a 
treaty under customary law, which explicitly follows from Article 3 of the VCLT I. 
104 Aust (n 36) 17. 
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Moreover, the elements of the Statement, e g readmission and EU accession, 
all belong in the international sphere.  
   Thirdly, the agreement should be concluded between states. This question 
relates to the previous discussion, on who the parties are to the EU-Turkey 
Statement. In case it is the Member States, this requirement is clearly met. 
However, the EU cannot be considered a state. Again, the definition in the 
VCLT I is not exhaustive for all treaties. According to the VCLT II, a treaty 
may be concluded ‘between one or more States and one or more international 
organizations, or between international organizations’.105 As follows, the 
term ‘treaty’ is not reserved for agreements between states. It also covers 
agreements entered by other actors of international law, such as the EU, but 
not for example agreements concluded between companies.106 
   Even before the final Statement was released, the argument was raised that 
the agreement would not be legally binding since it was headed 
‘Statement’.107 Therefore, no procedure of approval would be required, 
neither on EU nor on national level, and the Statement could not be legally 
challenged. This standpoint is not entirely without merit since the word 
‘Statement’ usually indicates that the instrument is intended to be non-
binding. However, it calls for further scrutiny.  
   It follows from Article 2 of the Vienna Conventions that the form or heading 
of the agreement is not relevant for its status as legally binding (‘whether 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and 
whatever its particular designation’). This has also been repeatedly upheld by 
international courts and tribunals. For example, the ICJ has consistently found 
that the form of an agreement is not decisive, but rather to what act it gives 
impression.108 In the ICJ case Aegean Sea, the situation was similar to the one 
                                                 
105 Article 2(1)(a) of the VCLT II. 
106 ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (United Kingdom v Iran) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ 
Reports 1952, 89.  
107 Steve Peers, ‘The draft EU/Turkey deal on migration and refugees: is it legal?’ (EU Law 
Analysis 16 March 2016) http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.se/2016/03/the-draft-euturkey-deal-
on-migration.html (accessed 16 May 2018); Karolína Babická, ‘EU-Turkey deal seems to 
be schizophrenic’ (MigrationOnline 22 March 2016) http://migrationonline.cz/en/eu-
turkey-deal-seems-to-be-schizophrenic (accessed 16 May 2018). 
108 This view has also been adopted under EU law, see Olivier Corten and Marianne Dony 
‘Accord politique ou juridique : Quelle est la nature du “machin” conclu entre l’UE et la 
Turquie en matière d’asile?’ (EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 10 June 2016) 
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at hand. Greece and Turkey had released a joint communiqué after a meeting 
and disputed in Court whether it constituted a treaty. The ICJ then held: 
 
On the question of form, the Court need only observe that it knows of no rule 
of international law which might preclude a joint communiqué from 
constituting an international agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration or 
judicial settlement (cf. Arts. 2, 3 and 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties). Accordingly, whether the Brussels Communiqué of 31 May 1975 
does or does not constitute such an agreement essentially depends on the nature 
of the act or transaction to which the Communiqué gives expression; and it 
does not settle the question simply to refer to the form - a communiqué - in 
which that act or transaction is embodied. On the contrary, in determining what 
was indeed the nature of the act or transaction embodied in the Brussels 
Communiqué, the Court must have regard above all to its actual terms and to 
the particular circumstances in which it was drawn up.
109
 
 
This position was repeated in another case, Qatar/Bahrain, where the only 
written text of an agreement was the minutes of a meeting held between the 
parties. The ICJ stated: 
 
…the Minutes are not a simple record of a meeting, similar to those drawn up 
within the framework of the Tripartite Committee; they do not merely give an 
account of discussions and summarize points of agreement and disagreement. 
They enumerate the commitments to which the Parties have consented. They 
thus create rights and obligations in international law for the Parties. They 
constitute an international agreement.
110
 
 
The ITLOS has also assessed whether a disputed instrument constituted a 
legally binding agreement. In the case of Bangladesh v Myanmar, the 
Tribunal held that ‘what is important is not the form or designation of an 
                                                 
http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/accord-politique-ou-juridique-quelle-est-la-nature-du-machin-
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109 ICJ, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey) (Judgment) ICJ Report 1978, 3, 
para 96.  
110 ICJ, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v Bahrain) (Judgment), ICJ Report 1949, 112, para 25. 
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instrument but its legal nature and content’.111 In their assessment, the 
Tribunal considered four factors: 
1. The language of the instrument 
2. The circumstances in which the instrument was adopted 
3. Competence to enter an agreement 
4. Internal constitutional actions112 
The reasoning by the courts and tribunal brings us to the fourth and most 
important requirement of the VCLT I definition; that the treaty should be 
governed by international law. Within this requirement lies the intention of 
the parties to be bound by the agreement.113 Just like in the assessments of the 
courts and tribunal, the legal nature of the instruments has to be examined 
considering the wording and the circumstances of their conclusion.114 
    While no particular wording is required for an instrument to constitute a 
treaty, the terminology often indicates the intention to be bound.115 In the EU-
Turkey Statement, the word ‘will’ is repeatedly used. This differs from the 
wording normally used in legally binding treaties (‘shall’ or ‘should’) and 
indicates that the Statement is of a political nature rather than legal. There are 
however other words of the Statement that implies that it is a legally binding 
act. Most importantly, it states that EU and Turkey ‘agreed on the following 
action points’. The use of the word ‘agreed’ indicates that the Statement 
constitutes an agreement, rather than a declaration of political principles. 
Other words that support this standpoint can be found throughout the 
Statement, such as ‘decided’ and ‘reconfirmed’.  
    Regarding the second requirement, the circumstances of the agreement, 
anything which might indicate the intention of parties may be taken into 
consideration, such as registration and previous practice of the states. The 
                                                 
111 ITLOS, Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal 
(Bangladesh/Myanmar),(Judgment), ITLOS Reports 2012, 4, para 89.  
112 Ibid, paras 92-97. 
113 Though it is under discussion to what extent the actual intention of the parties is 
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subject of the agreement is not relevant since the elements of a legally binding 
agreement can be found in a non-legally binding as well.116 The EU-Turkey 
Statement has not been registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations 
by any of the possible parties. However, while registration might indicate an 
intention of the parties to be legally bound, absence of registration does not 
affect the validity or binding nature of an agreement.117 Turning to the 
previous practice, this again depends on who the parties are. There have not 
been any previous agreements between the 28 EU Member States and Turkey, 
but both the EU and Greece has previously entered agreements with Turkey 
on readmission. These agreements had similar content, but also a quite 
different form. There is therefore no established practice between the parties 
on entering agreements through press releases. The previous agreements were 
not very successful, which raises questions on why a similar agreement 
should take a non-legally binding form. The agreement would still be 
politically binding, but its implementation would be less foreseeable. The 
other circumstances of the EU-Turkey Statement are difficult to assess since, 
as previously mentioned, there is no public record of the discussions of the 
18 March 2016. There is however a leaked draft of the Statement, according 
to which ‘The agreement will be formulated as an EU-Turkey statement’.118 
This indicates that while the text was released as a statement for the press, the 
intention of the parties was to enter an agreement. 
    In the case law mentioned above, the ITLOS also considered the 
competence of the acting agent and the internal constitutional procedure. 
When the Statement was entered, several provisions of competence were 
disregarded, both under domestic law and EU law. However, if violations of 
internal constitutional frameworks would deprive an instrument of its status 
as a treaty, this would disregard the protection of third states acting in good 
faith. Moreover, Article 46 of the Vienna Conventions (discussed in the next 
section) which regulates these situations would become entirely superfluous. 
                                                 
116 Aust (n 26) 34. 
117 ICJ (n 110) para 29; ITLOS (n 111) para 99. 
118 Statewatch, EU-Turkey 18/3/2016 NON-PAPER, published 16 March 2016 
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This indicates that taking these factors into account is an incorrect application 
of law. I therefore choose to disregard this factor in my assessment.  
   To summarise these findings, the EU-Turkey Statement is in many ways an 
unusual instrument. Under customary law, several factors are accepted as 
indicators of an agreement’s legally binding nature. The main issue is the 
intention of the parties to be bound by international law as expressed by the 
wording and circumstances of entering the agreement. Here, parts of the 
wording and the circumstances of the conclusion of the Statement indicate 
that it might be legally binding. However, the ambiguities on this subject open 
up for further discussion. While strongest support is given to the viewpoint 
that the EU-Turkey Statement is a treaty under international law, indications 
are not unitary, and the EU would, if necessary, also have a good chance at 
arguing that the agreement is not legally binding. Consequently, the 
informalities of the EU-Turkey Statement create legal flexibility. 
 
 Possible Invalidity 
As has been explained so far, the EU-Turkey Statement is most likely a treaty 
but one with several obscurities regarding its conclusion. It is therefore 
relevant to consider whether the treaty might be invalid. Even if the Statement 
is legally binding under international law, it might still be possible to annul 
it. Of all situations in which a treaty may be invalid, the one most relevant for 
us is found in Article 46 of the VCLT I. 
 
2.4.2.1 Article 46 
Article 46 of the VCLT I concerns international agreements that have been 
entered in violation of provisions on competence to conclude treaties. As 
shown in section 2.3, this might be applicable both on the EU and most of the 
Member States. Paragraph 1 of the article states: 
 
A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has 
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding 
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation 
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was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental 
importance. 
 
The article is written with double negation (may not, unless) to accentuate 
that it is only applicable in exceptional cases. This is an attempt to balance 
state sovereignty and the principle of security of international agreements.119 
The requirements for invalidity are that the violated internal rule has to be of 
fundamental importance and that the violation has to be manifest. The second 
requirement is explained further in the article’s next paragraph: 
 
A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State 
conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good 
faith. 
 
In other words, the violated provision can only invalidate a treaty if the other 
party knew or ought to have known that the provision was being violated.120 
    Regarding the other requirement, fundamental importance, this importance 
does not depend on whether the provision is considered constitutional or not 
under domestic law. Rather, it is defined by its role in the institutional and 
political structure of the State, and in the relationship between the State and 
the citizens.121 Consequently, whether a provision is of fundamental 
importance depends on the specific characteristics of each state and has to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. There are however some general guidelines. 
In democracies, the requirement of parliamentary approval when concluding 
treaties is considered to be of fundamental importance. The same goes for the 
distribution of competence to enter treaties in federations.122 The agreement 
only becomes invalid if Article 46 is invoked by the state whose provision 
was violated. In practice, this is very rare and the case law on invalidity of 
treaties is scarce.123  
                                                 
119 See also Arts 7 and 27 of the VCLT I. 
120 Thilo Rensmann, ‘Article 46’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012) 775, 784, 
para 27. 
121 Ibid, 789, para 39. 
122 Ibid, 790, para 40. 
123 Aust (n 26) 312. 
 44 
    At the time of its drafting, the article was considered a progressive 
development of international law. Previously, international practice 
surrounding invalidity issues was scattered. However, both Article 46 of the 
VCLT I and its counterpart in the VCLT II were adopted without dissenting 
votes and have since then been applied consistently. Therefore, both articles 
are today considered to reflect customary law.124  
 
2.4.2.2 The EU as the Party 
In case the EU is the party to the Statement, we need to turn to the EU acquis 
on conclusion of treaties. Several provisions were ignored when entering the 
EU-Turkey Statement. Most importantly, rules on competence were 
disregarded and the European Parliament did not approve of the agreement. 
As has been previously mentioned, the EU is sui generis in international law 
and may be described as a mixture of an international organisation, a 
supranational organisation and a federation. By analogy to states, both the 
requirement of parliamentary consent and the distribution of competence are 
in general considered to be essential. The violated provisions in relation to 
the EU-Turkey Statement was thereby clearly of fundamental importance 
under Article 46 of the VCLT I. 
    It is difficult to assess the manifest requirement under VCLT I, since the 
European Council does not have a clear counterpart in state organs, the way 
for example the European Parliament does. However, like most of the articles 
in VCLT I, a counterpart for international organisations can be found in the 
VCLT II. Here, Article 46 refers to ‘the rules of the organization’ instead of 
‘a provision of internal law’. In our case, this would be the treaties. The 
manifest requirement of Article 46 has either been met if the other party had 
actual knowledge of the violated provision or was negligently ignorant.125 
The only case law on how to assess this in relation to the EU comes from the 
CJEU. In France v Commission and Parliament v Council and Commission, 
EU institutions had entered international agreements with third countries in 
violation of the distribution of competence. In both cases, the CJEU 
                                                 
124 Rensmann (n 120), 803, para 77.  
125 Ibid, 791, para 45. 
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considered the agreements to be binding for the EU under international law.126 
It therefore seems unlikely that the EU would invoke Article 46 in relation to 
non-members. The internal rules of the EU are quite complicated and, just 
like in relation to other states, non-members cannot be expected to familiarise 
themselves with the internal legal framework.127 However, in our case, 
Turkey has negotiated on accession to the EU since 2005. While Turkey may 
not be expected to have knowledge on the competence of the institutions, it 
appears questionable that they de facto did not know.  
 
2.4.2.3 The Member States as the Parties 
In case the Member States are the parties, there might be domestic provisions 
limiting the Heads of State or Government from entering international 
agreements on behalf of their states. There is a variety of constitutional 
frameworks in the 28 Member States, but it does not seem like parliamentary 
consent to the EU-Turkey Statement has been given in any of them. In 
democracies, the requirement of parliamentary approval when concluding 
treaties is in general considered to be of fundamental importance. 
    However, Article 46 cannot be invoked in cases where the agreement was 
entered by the Head of State or Government. This is due to the explicit 
mention of Heads of State or Government in Article 7(2)(a) of the VCLT I as 
having indisputable authority to express consent.128 Article 46 should only be 
used in exceptional circumstances due to the protection of states acting in 
good faith. As a consequence of Article 7(2)(a), a state that has entered an 
agreement with another state’s Head of State or Government is considered to 
have acted in good faith. Therefore, the violation of the internal provision 
cannot be considered manifest in this case. 
 
                                                 
126 Case C-327/91, France v Commission EU:C:1994:305, para 25; Joined cases C-317/04 
and C-318/04, Parliament v Council and Commission EU:C:2006:346, para 73. 
127 Rensmann (n 120), 801, para 73; Aust (n 26) 314. This also applies to situations when 
Member States enter international agreements which infringe EU obligations or encroach 
EU competence, see case C-466/98 Commission v United Kingdom EU:C:2002:624. 
128 Aust (n 26) 83. 
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  Conclusion 
In this section I examined whether the Statement could be considered legally 
binding under international law. The agreement differs in several ways from 
a traditional treaty, but this definition is very wide. After all, the Statement is 
written, between international actors and concerns an international subject. 
On the fourth requirement, on the intention of the parties to be bound, the 
indicators are divided. Some of the wording and the circumstances imply that 
the Statement is a political agreement, and other that it is legal. As the 
framework of the European Council lacks transparency, we do not have 
access to much information on the conclusion of the Statement. This opens 
up for further argumentation in case the question would be brought to court. 
   I also considered whether the parties of the EU-Turkey Statement could 
claim invalidity in order to avoid accountability. The answer differs 
depending on who the party is. In case the EU is the party, they could argue 
that Turkey had knowledge of their constitutional framework. This is more 
difficult for the Member States, since their Heads of State or Government are 
explicitly granted the right to enter international agreements under the VCLT 
I. In summary, the chances to claim invalidity are small with the EU as a 
party, but impossible with the Member States as the parties.  
 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter I have shown two different ways in which the EU-Turkey 
Statement differs from traditional treaties. The hypothesis formulated in the 
beginning of this chapter was:  
 
The legal nature of the EU-Turkey Statement aims to divert the EU of 
accountability. 
 
The avoidance of accountability through the agreement’s legal nature consists 
of two parts: the parties and the form. As the parties of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, first believed to be the EU, are now the Member States, the legal 
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issues of the Statement have moved from the EU level to the national level. 
While the Member States have not followed their own requirements on 
parliamentary consent, approval by the European Parliament was not 
required. The issue that remains for the EU is the division of competence and 
the Member States’ obligations towards the EU under the treaties. However, 
only the Commission can initiate an infringement procedure for this breach, 
which they have no interest in doing. For Turkey, the current situation is less 
than satisfactory, as it has now entered a multilateral agreement with 28 other 
countries. Moreover, the Statement does not specify how the obligations 
towards Turkey should be fulfilled by these 28 parties, especially since some 
obligations require action by EU institutions. 
    Another issue for Turkey would be to show that the Statement is a legally 
binding agreement. While it appears to be a treaty, the form of the Statement 
also makes it possible to argue for the opposite position. This is an issue for 
union citizens and migrants affected by the Statement as well, as an action for 
annulment only can be brought before the General Court on acts which have 
legal effects. Consequently, the conclusion of the Statement cannot be tried 
against the treaties or the Charter unless the legally binding nature of the 
Statement is established.  
    In general, there is a reluctance by institutions to assess the EU-Turkey 
Statement and bring clear answers on its legal nature. Despite resting on 
shaky grounds, the Statement is essential for political stability within the EU 
and is in practice an exercise of EU power. It was concluded within the EU 
framework by EU organs in order to solve an EU issue. However, keeping 
the EU accountable for the effects of the Statement is very difficult due to its 
form and the context of its conclusion. Therefore, I consider the hypothesis 
of this chapter confirmed. 
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3 Explaining Unconventional 
Form 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the legal form of the EU-Turkey 
Statement aims at detaching the EU from accountability. In this chapter I will 
answer my research question by examining why this form was chosen. As the 
previous chapter has shown, the legal nature of the EU-Turkey Statement is 
quite complex. In NF v European Council, the European Council argues that 
the unusual conclusion of the Statement was a result of mistakes and 
coincidences. However, the benefits of keeping the agreement in its current 
form indicates legal competence. The question of ‘why’ may first seem 
simple. Who would not want to avoid accountability of actions considered 
both legally and morally questionable? Nevertheless, not all readmission 
agreements are informal. So why was this form chosen in this particular 
context? I will begin this chapter by outlining the character of informal 
international agreements and the increasing trend of abandoning the 
traditional treaty form. Thereafter I will discuss how the context of the EU-
Turkey Statement may have affected its form, first with regard to the 
relationship between the EU and Turkey and secondly by considering the 
2015 migrant influx.  
 
3.2 Informal Agreements 
When entering an international agreement, the negotiating parties can always 
choose freely whether they wish to be legally bound. There is no subject 
regulated by a legally binding international agreement that could not be 
agreed upon in a non-legally binding form.129 In several ways, a non-legally 
binding agreement comes with fewer obstacles, on the domestic as well as on 
the international level. In his article on the subject,130 Charles Lipson 
identifies four main reasons for choosing informal agreements over formal: 
                                                 
129 Aust (n 26) 37. 
130 Lipson (n 18). 
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1. Avoid ratification. When a democratic state enters a traditional treaty, 
approval by the legislative organ is normally required. However, this 
is not the case with legally non-binding agreements. The 
independence from parliamentary support can be a reason in itself for 
choosing to keep an agreement informal, but it also brings about the 
other three reasons stated below. 
2. Flexibility. Informal agreements can easily be amended since they do 
not set out a regulated amendment procedure. As a consequence, the 
drafting procedure is also facilitated since there is no need to foresee 
and prevent all the future problems that may arise. This is convenient 
in situations that are complex or rapidly changing. 
3. Rapidity. Since an informal agreement does not require any elaborate 
ratification procedure, it can be entered swiftly. This can be beneficial 
when a state needs to react fast to a situation. 
4. Invisibility. Informal agreements are in general less public and 
prominent than their formal counterparts. Even if the agreement is not 
kept secret, the lack of a ratification debate reduces public discussion. 
This makes informal agreements more suitable for controversial 
subjects than formal agreements.  
The main issue with choosing an informal agreement is the increased risk of 
abandonment. Compared to the domestic context, the difference between 
legally and non-legally binding agreements is smaller since there is no 
supranational with a monopoly of violence. In international law, no one can 
enforce an agreement except the states themselves. Instead, the parties’ future 
reputation on the international scene is the main guarantee of compliance. 
However, as an informal agreement is considered less of a commitment, the 
political costs of abandoning an informal agreement is in general lower than 
of a formal agreement.131  
    For long, international law was seen as an ever-expanding area. 
International agreements and conventions were reoccurring solutions to 
                                                 
131 Lipson (n 18) 534; Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Informalising Readmission Agreements in 
the EU Neighbourhood’ (2007) 42[2] The International Spectator 179, 190. 
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problems which stretched across borders. However, in the last decades, 
international law-making has decreased in its traditional form. Agreements 
are still concluded, but they dispense with formalities connected to the output, 
process or involved actors. Terms such as ‘treaty’ or ‘international 
agreement’ are avoided, and the drafted documents are instead given titles 
such as ‘conference’, ‘initiative’ or ‘strategy’.132 The informalization trend is 
not the same as a resort to soft law. While soft law mainly refers to a different 
output, informalization also differs regarding the involved actors and 
processes. The new type of agreements is ‘not only non-binding under 
international law, but outside of the traditional international law 
altogether’.133  
    In their study of the subject, Joost Pauwelyn, Jan Wouters and Ramses 
Wessels recognized three reasons for the development. First, society is 
becoming increasingly complex with regard to knowledge and structures. 
This requires further flexibility of international agreements. Secondly, the 
international network is becoming more diverse. The international scene has 
historically been dominated by states. Currently, there are new actors and 
networks appearing, such as corporative cooperations, NGOs and coalitions 
of farmers or consumers. As treaties can only be entered by states, informal 
law-making is required. Thirdly, there is an unwillingness among many states 
to give up the political power held in constitutions and elected politicians to 
the benefit of agreements entered by multilateral organisations. Since the 
2008 financial crisis, this position has especially affected agreements that 
may turn out to be an economic burden.134  
    The use of non-traditional forms for readmission agreements has been met 
with criticism. Some have argued that informal readmission agreements tend 
to side-step human rights guarantees, lack transparency and be less 
controllable by democratic institutions.135 Consequently, it is considered 
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destructive for democracy and inter-state relations as well as from a 
perspective of migrant protection. While readmission agreements are 
reciprocal, the negotiating states usually have different interests in 
readmission. Formally, the parties of the agreement have equal rights of 
readmitting citizens or migrants to the other party. In practice however, 
migrant-receiving states benefit from the agreement to a larger extent than 
migrant-sending. Countries with a strong interest of entering readmission 
agreements are found in the Global North. For them, successful deportations 
lower the economic costs for detention and send a political message that the 
government has control over its border.136 Migrant-sending countries, on the 
other hand, usually have little to win but much to lose from entering a 
readmission agreement. When migrants find employment in richer countries, 
they tend to send home revenues, providing their families with a higher 
standard of living. In small countries, revenues can make up a substantial part 
of the gross domestic product. Migration also lowers the pressure of domestic 
unemployment. 137 As a consequence, entering a readmission agreement is 
often an unpopular political decision in migrant-sending countries. 
   In his study from 2007, Jean-Pierre Cassarino found that the countries 
which entered formal readmission agreements with the EU were mainly 
situated in Eastern Europe and had future possibilities of EU accession. This 
included for example Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova. Often, 
promises on visa facilitation was involved in the negotiations. According to 
Cassarino, the hopes of accession and visa facilitation were the main 
incentives for entering these agreements.138 Informal readmission agreements 
were usually entered with Southern or Eastern Mediterranean countries 
without chances of EU accession. These agreements required longer and more 
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complicated negotiations. Moreover, the invisibility factor was essential for 
choosing a non-traditional form, as the countries did not wish to appear as if 
they were bending to Europe’s will on expense of their own citizens.139 
   In his article, Cassarino only considers the third countries’ reasons for 
choosing to enter a formal or an informal agreement, implying that the EU 
always prefers to enter formal agreements. While this might have been correct 
when his study was conducted, EU representatives have made several 
statements encouraging more informal cooperation since the 2015 migrant 
influx.140 In the discussions surrounding the creation of the EAM, the need 
for ensuring successful returns has been stressed as a main priority.141 In the 
Action Plan concluded by the Member States on the Valletta Summit of 11-
12 November 2015, this is stated as a need to ‘develop practical cooperation 
arrangements and bilateral dialogues on implementation of returns with 
regard, in particular, to identification and issuance of travel documents’.142 
Also in its conclusions of 28 June 2016, the European Council called for the 
establishment of more ‘legally non-binding working arrangement’.143  
   This appears to have been implemented, which corresponds with the 
informalization trend previously discussed. Of the 18 readmission agreements 
entered by the EU between 2012 and 2016, only four were in a traditional 
form. The informal agreements have been entered under headings such as 
‘Mobility Partnership’, ‘Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility’, ‘Joint 
Way Forward’ or ‘Good Practices for the Efficient Operation of the Return 
Procedure’.144  
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EU Readmission Arrangements145 
 
           Informal Agreements                        Formal Agreements 
Country Concluded Country Entered into force 
Afghanistan 02/10/2016 Albania 01/05/2016 
Armenia 27/10/2011 Armenia 01/01/2014 
Azerbaijan 05/12/2013 Azerbaijan 01/09/2014 
Bangladesh 25/09/2017  FYROM 
(Macedonia) 
01/01/2008 
Belarus 13/10/2016  Georgia 01/03/2011 
Cape Verde 05/06/2008  Hong Kong 01/03/2004 
Cote d’Ivoire 16/04/2016 Macao 01/06/2004 
Ethiopia 11/11/2015  Moldova 01/01/2008 
Georgia 30/11/2009 Montenegro 01/01/2008 
Ghana 16/04/2016 Pakistan 01/12/2010  
Guinea 24/07/2017  Russia 01/06/2007 
India 29/03/2016 Serbia 01/01/2008 
Jordan 09/10/2014 Sri Lanka 01/05/2005 
Mali 11/12/2016 Turkey 01/10/2014 
Moldova 05/06/2008  Ukraine 01/01/2008 
Morocco 07/06/2013   
Niger 03/05/2016   
Nigeria 12/03/2015    
Tunisia 03/03/2014   
Turkey 18/03/2016   
 
In this table, there is a connection between cultural and economic status and 
which type of readmission arrangement that is used. In the column to the left, 
on formal agreements, we find mainly countries that are either European or 
Westernized (such as Hong Kong). The other column, which lists the parties 
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to informal readmission arrangement, is dominated by states in Northern 
Africa, Western Africa and Southwest Asia. By comparison, within the EU 
readmission of asylum seekers is even more formalized as it is legislated 
through a regulation.146 There appears to be a connection between the level 
of formalization and whether the third country is considered European, or 
rather how European.147 As noted by Cassarino, visa liberalisation has been 
one of the main incentives to enter readmission agreements with the EU. As 
shown elsewhere, there is a mobility divide between OECD and non-OECD 
countries, where citizens of rich countries enjoy visa freedom to a much larger 
extent than citizens of other countries.148 The division between formal and 
informal agreements appears to correspond to this divide, but this would 
require further research. 
    Several countries in Eastern Asia can be found in both columns. Armenia, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey have all entered both informal and formal 
agreements on readmission with the EU. However, except for in Turkey’s 
case, the informal agreements were all entered before the formal readmission 
agreements. This reflects the EU strategy to use informal agreements to 
initiate cooperation in order to enter a formal agreement at a later stage.149 
With Turkey, the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement was entered before the 
EU-Turkey Statement was released. In the following section we will consider 
this agreement further. 
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3.3 EU-Turkey Relations 
 
In several ways, Turkey holds a particular position in relation to the EU. The 
country is situated on Europe’s border and has been a member of the Council 
of Europe since 1949. Formally, it has the potential of EU accession, but in 
practice this progress is slow. Turkey expressed interest in joining the EU 
(then the EEC) already in 1959 and signed the Ankara Agreement on 
accession in 1963. In the 70s and 80s, Turkey struggled economically as well 
as politically, which was an obstacle for its accession. However, since the 
middle of the 90s the EU-Turkey relationship has improved and in 1999 
Turkey was given official candidacy status. 
    For long, negotiations were stalled since Turkey was required to fulfil the 
Copenhagen criteria to be eligible for membership. These criteria require 
candidate countries to hold a high standard of economic stability, democracy, 
rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities. The criteria were not 
fulfilled until 2005. The first chapter of accession was opened in 2006 but 
was closed on the same day. The reason was that EU asked Turkey to 
implement the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which included 
an update of the ten Member States that joined the EU in 2004. However, this 
would require Turkey to recognise Southern Cyprus, which it refused. Since 
then, negotiations have been proceeding at a slow pace. Attempts have been 
made to reopen some of the accession chapters, but the negotiations were 
blocked, first by France in 2007 and later by Cyprus in 2009.150  
    Since Turkey first expressed a will to join the EU, almost 60 years ago, 
several other countries have gone through the accession procedure in much 
shorter time. However, none of them were Muslim. Since Turkey fulfilled the 
Copenhagen Criteria, the disinclination to access Turkey into the union has 
often been discussed in terms of orientalism.151 Culturally, Turkey is 
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considered to hold a ‘liminal’ position towards the EU. It is not a clearly 
defined ‘Other’ which Europe can reflect and define itself in relation to. 
Neither is it considered to be just another European country. Turkey is not 
quite out, but also never completely let inside.152  
   For example, in discussions on Turkey in the European Parliament, 
exclusion is often legitimized by referring to Europe’s Christian tradition. 
This is put in terms of differences regarding ‘culture’ or ‘values’.153 Enlarging 
the EU to include Turkey brings the European identity into question and 
causes discussion on what is truly European. Within the EU, the attitude 
towards Turkey has always been divided. When the accession negotiations 
with Turkey were revitalized in 2005, several Member States opposed this 
development.154 Turkey has however never been entirely excluded as a 
candidate. This can be compared to the response to Morocco’s application in 
1987 which was unequivocally negative. Unlike Turkey, Morocco was 
clearly not European.155 Turkey on the other hand is situated in Europe’s 
periphery, both in regards of geography and identity. This ambivalent position 
is also reflected in Turkey’s relation to the EU. Unlike candidate countries in 
Eastern and Central Europe, Turkey has not been outright willing to accept 
the EU’s conditions for accession. Within Turkey, there is a similar 
perception of Europe as a threat, which aims to weaken Turkey, in particular 
by strengthening Cyprus and the Kurdish community.156  
   The negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the 2014 EU-Turkey 
Readmission Agreement are well-documented. They began in 2005, at the 
same time as EU-Turkey relations improved. In this agreement, visa 
liberalization was also a central element. In previous discussions with 
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Member States, Turkey had primarily requested financial resources for border 
management. When the negotiations of the readmission agreement began, 
Turkey asked for visa liberalizations similar to those that had just been 
granted countries in Western Balkan. However, the EU ministers of interior 
were only willing to commit to a ‘dialogue on visa, mobility and 
migration’.157 As discussed above, the Member States had varied 
relationships to Turkey and some were not willing to begin a visa 
liberalization process. After continued negotiations, an actual dialogue was 
opened in 2011.158 
    Several of the EU Member States wanted to be certain that the readmission 
agreement would be used in practice before beginning to implement the visa 
liberalization roadmap. Possibly, this was due to the experience of the 
Greece-Turkey Protocol from 2002, which hardly resulted in any 
readmissions. Therefore, they required Turkey to ratify the readmission 
agreement before they committed to visa liberalizations. Turkey on the other 
hand had experienced discrimination in the past and had low trust that the visa 
liberalization roadmap would be completed.159 The lack of clear answers and 
the divergent positions of the EU Member States increased the perception of 
the visa liberalization roadmap as weak and lacking credibility.160 
   As follows, the complex relationship between Turkey and the EU affected 
their ability to negotiate agreements. Moreover, the 2014 agreement was 
negotiated at a time when Euroscepticism was much lower than today, in 
Turkey as well as in the EU.161 Taking these factors into account, entering an 
informal agreement might have been a simpler task for the European Heads 
of State and Government. From Turkey’s perspective, it is questionable that 
it would have intended to enter into a, possibly non-binding, agreement with 
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28 other parties. However, it is possible that the legal definition was not 
important to Turkey. It has been argued that international law holds a weak 
position in Middle Eastern countries due to orientalism in international 
relations. As international law has been applied in a different manner in the 
Middle East compared to the Western world, it has become considered 
instrumental rather than objective. As a result, international law lacks 
legitimacy in the region.162 In a similar way, Turkey already considered itself 
to have been discriminated in its relations with the EU, also in formal 
relations. Moreover, if Turkey was skeptical of cooperating with the EU on 
migration matters, it appears to have been correct. While several returns of 
migrants from Greece have taken place, there has been slow or no progress 
of the EU’s obligations towards Turkey flowing from the EU-Turkey 
Statement.163 
   The controversy of cooperating with Turkey most likely affected the choice 
to enter an informal agreement. However, there were also other factors 
involved. The pressing issue of the ongoing migrant ‘crisis’ required a swifter 
response than had been possible to reach through a formal procedure. The 
negotiations leading up to the 2014 EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement took 
in total ten years. By contrast, the discussions on the EU-Turkey Statement 
began in November 2015 and ended four months later. While the conclusion 
of the second agreement was probably facilitated by the existence of the first, 
this is nevertheless a major difference. Therefore, we need to how the context 
of the crisis affected the course of action. 
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3.4 Reaction to Migration Crisis 
 
Over the last decades, there have been several deficits in EU migration 
policies which culminated in the 2015 migration crisis. The EU has tried to 
control and avert unwanted immigration through combining different 
preventive measures, such as carrier sanctions and visa obligations, while 
proposals for legal pathways have consistently been opposed. Between the 
Member States, the system for division of responsibility has been the recast 
Dublin Regulation which concentrates asylum seekers on the EU’s external 
borders and coastal countries. Consequently, Italy, Greece and Hungary, 
which are all countries in unstable economic and political situations, receive 
a disproportionate amount of asylum applications compared to the other EU 
countries. The failure of the Dublin mechanism has been pointed out for long 
without any response.164 
   As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, informal agreements are 
chosen for their speed, flexibility, invisibility and the avoidance of a 
ratification procedure. These reasons correspond well to the situation of a 
crisis. In particular the factors of speed and flexibility are beneficial in a 
rapturing situation where circumstances change fast. The factor of invisibility 
is only partly applicable to our situation. On the one hand, the Statement has 
received much attention and the EU has portrayed it as the antidote of the 
migrant influx.165 On the other, the agreement was never discussed in the 
European Parliament but instead kept secret until it was released. Thereby the 
European Council avoided a public debate on their relations with Turkey and 
on human rights concerns before the agreement was in force.  
   In political theory and legal theory, many have written on the actions of 
sovereign states at times of crisis.166 Lately, the subject of state of emergency 
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 60 
has seen a revival, in particular following 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis.167 
It is in general accepted that a sovereign power is allowed, to a certain degree, 
to set aside constitutional provisions and human rights guarantees at a time 
when it considers itself threatened. As a means for self-preservation, the 
sovereign assumes the role of the judiciary and suspends some of the rules of 
law.168 This course of action can be traced back to the Roman Empire, and 
variations can be found in most constitutions and human rights conventions 
today.169 Usually, this exceptional state is triggered by activating one 
particular provision. In order to protect the rule of law, lawlessness is then 
created by and included in the law. Consequently, the line between law and 
politics becomes blurred. 
   The procedure of a sovereign entering into a state of emergency is defined 
by the shift of power from the legislative to the executive. This is the same 
process that occurs when an international agreement is concluded informally 
rather than in a traditional form. Both these actions are characterized by a 
withdrawal of the legal to the benefit of the political. This reflects a standpoint 
that at times of crisis, constitutional frameworks and bureaucracy become 
shackles.  
   As the EU is no sovereign, it has no legal framework for entering a state of 
emergency. While it is possible to derogate from fundamental rights of the 
Charter under certain conditions, the principle of non-refoulement remains 
absolute. Moreover, high migration influx has not been considered a 
legitimate ground for exceptions under European human rights law.170 
Consequently, there is no way within the law to explicitly exempt migrants 
from protection at times of crisis.  
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   However, as has been discussed previously, while the EU is not a sovereign, 
it resembles a sovereign in several ways. Since it is an important political 
actor on the European scene, its institutions hold a strong interest of self-
preservation. Moreover, the checks and balances of the system are mainly 
between the Union and the Member States, similar to the construction of a 
federation. The Commission is supposed to promote the EU project, while the 
European Council should prevent it from growing too strong on behalf of the 
Member States.171 
   The constitutional framework and fundamental rights norms are also 
supposed to be upheld by the EU courts. The question of why the General 
Court decided to avoid a substantial judgment has already been discussed in 
a previous chapter. However, as a consequence of the orders, the action for 
annulment pathway is blocked. As the agreement is between the Member 
States and Turkey, it can no longer be tried on the EU level. The only possible 
consequence would be if the Commission would begin infringement 
procedures towards the Member States for disregarding the division of 
competence and thereby failing to fulfil their obligations. However, neither 
the Commission nor any other EU institution have an interest in interfering 
with the EU-Turkey Statement. From the position of the Member States, the 
Statement prevents migrants from entering the EU, which, they hope, will 
also prevent further spread of nationalism and racism within the European 
countries. From the position of the EU, the EU-Turkey Statement concealed 
internal conflicts and indicated unity as well as ability to take action at a time 
when Euroscepticism was rising. Consequently, the EU and the Member 
States have a mutual interest in shifting the burden of the migrants over on 
Turkey, at the expense of human rights protection.  
   Despite the lack of legal pathways for exempting the constitutional 
framework and fundamental rights norms, combining the mutual feeling of 
crisis and the reliance on division of power creates a similar effect. Rather 
than an exception from law within the law, this situation becomes an 
exception from law besides the law. 
                                                 
171 Cf Arts 15-17 TEU. 
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   The EU-Turkey Statement reflects the EU’s position on the international 
scene. On the one hand, the EU has seized power over subjects traditionally 
connected to sovereignty and the self-determination of states, such as borders 
and migration.172 Since the 2015 crisis, this control appears to increase. On 
the other hand, the EU cannot be held accountable for its migration policies. 
This is instead transferred to the Member States, as if the EU was not an 
independent legal actor at all.173 This position poses a new case for 
international law. In an anarchical legal order, the sovereignty of all actors 
has to be absolute. Consequently, the privileged position of the EU as a sui 
generis actor enables it to create legal acts which does not fit the current 
system, such as the EU-Turkey Statement. 
   Returning to the theoretical framework laid out by political theorists, the 
main issue with the state of emergency is the risk of normalization. That is, 
what was first considered an exceptional and temporary shift of power soon 
becomes the normal state of affairs. The state of emergency becomes 
permanent. This change does not have to take the form of legislation but could 
also be a change in constitutional practices where the relation between 
different democratic institutions is gradually transformed. Historically, 
activating a state of emergency has often been a crucial step in a development 
a more centralized and authoritarian form of government.174 In the EU, the 
EAM is continuously being developed. Even though migration to the EU’s 
external borders has dropped,175 new proposals for policies and legislation are 
still being made to manage the migration crisis. These proposals aim to 
minimise the differences in reception standards between the Member States 
and to develop a system for relocation of asylum seekers.176 Consequently, 
the Member States’ discretion on migration issues is being further narrowed. 
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   As previously discussed, the EAM has also led to the conclusion of several 
readmission agreements between the EU and third countries in Western and 
Northern Africa. These agreements have primarily been informal, following 
the general trend of informalization of international law. In summary, the 
responses from the EU to the 2015 migration crisis has been to expand its 
control over Member States as well as third countries. 
   The aim of checks and balances is to prevent abuse of power and secure the 
democratic will. In the case of the EU-Turkey Statement, no democratic 
institution has opposed itself to the agreement. So, if everyone agrees, what 
is the problem? I would like to finish this thesis by stating two of the issues 
with the method of concluding the EU-Turkey Statement. This is necessary, 
as actions undertaken as an answer to emergencies tend to legitimise 
themselves by the need to restore order, without asking the question of which 
order that is restored. 
   First, the issue of accountability. In the words of Lipson, ‘informality is best 
understood as a device for minimizing the impediments to cooperation, at 
both the domestic and international levels’.177 To begin with, formal 
agreements require a ratification procedure, while informal agreements do 
not. As has been noted by Pauwelyn, Wouters and Wessels, this distinction 
does not make sense. Legally non-binding agreements can be just as 
constraining on individual freedom or as affecting on public policy and 
external relations as legally binding agreements. Considering the reasons for 
demanding parliamentary consent, the requirement for ratification should be 
dependent on the subject matter and the impact of the agreement, not its 
form.178 International agreements are always a type of coercion, and all acts 
of coercion should be possible to hold accountable.179 
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   Moreover, the concept of democracy stretches past parliamentary consent. 
As was initially stated in this chapter, one of the benefits of informal 
agreements is their invisibility and the avoidance of public discussion due to 
the lack of a ratification debate. While there was a strong support of the EU-
Turkey Statement when it was concluded, as well a general aversion against 
migrants,180 we cannot know if a prior public discussion would have led to 
the same outcome. Both migration and the relationship to Turkey are 
controversial issues which divide the Member States.  
   The final accountability issue is that agreements such as the EU-Turkey 
Statement cuts off one legal remedy on human rights guarantees. As has been 
argued previously, the agreement was entered to serve EU interests. In the 
current situation, it is not possible to assess whether the Statement is in 
accordance with human rights norms on the same level as the agreement was 
concluded. Also, since the EU is not a Contracting Party of the ECHR, its 
actions cannot be tried by the Strasbourg Court. Nevertheless, both Turkey 
and Greece are parties to the Convention and the possibility still remains to 
appeal the returns to the ECtHR. While all EU Member States benefit from 
the agreement, the downgrading of the human rights record would only affect 
Greece. However, appealing to the ECtHR is in practice a very difficult and 
lengthy procedure, mainly available in theory. 
   Moreover, it is necessary to reflect over who it is that formulates a crisis, 
and what is considered to be its cause. Historically, the issue with state of 
emergency has been that the sovereign is the one entrusted with the power to 
activate the exception. If the sovereign itself can decide when to suspend 
democracy, democracy becomes an illusion as it is always dependent on the 
good will of the sovereign.181 In our situation, the problem lies outside of the 
judicial sphere. The migrant influx of 2015 was consistently described as a 
‘migrant crisis’ in media as well as in public discussion. However, the cause 
of the crisis could also have been framed as the lack of legal pathways or 
internal EU solidarity or even the issue of global economic injustice. Instead, 
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it was described as an external ‘unprecedented pressure’.182 In general, 
migration is a subject which is often described as a crisis. Over time, the 
depiction of migrants as a threat, using word such as ‘flood’ or ‘crisis’, has 
increased.183 As Douglas Massey has shown in his studies on the subject, 
cultivating a ’politics of fear’ against migrants can often be a strategy for 
achieving political and economic gains.184  
   To a certain extent this is just a drawback of democracy, which occur also 
in domestic contexts and in regular legislation procedures. Nevertheless, to 
shape a norm as an unclear agreement such as the EU-Turkey Statement 
increases the risk of basing it on erroneous grounds. As the use of informal 
agreements facilitates the conclusion procedure, avoids ratification debates 
and accountability procedures as well as occasionally keeps the whole 
agreement invisible, the scope for substantial discussion and scrutiny 
becomes limited. Consequently, it becomes difficult to dissect the basis of a 
decision. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In recent years, the EU has increasingly abandoned formal readmission 
agreements, in particular in relation to non-European countries. The main 
benefit of informalization is the avoidance of ratification. As no 
parliamentary consent is required, an informal agreement can be concluded 
much quicker and less visible compared to a formal agreement. As a result, 
informal agreements are particularly beneficial on controversial subjects, or 
as a reaction to a crisis. 
                                                 
182 European Commission (n 2). 
183 Leo Chavez, Covering Immigration: Population Images and the Politics of the 
Nation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001); Marisa Abrajano and Hajnal 
Zoltan, White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2015). 
184 Douglas Massey, ‘A Missing Element in Migration Theories’ (2015) 12[3] Migration 
Letters 279, 287-288; cf Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2006) and Daniel Gardner, The Science of Fear: Why We Fear the 
Things We Shouldn't--and Put Ourselves in Greater Danger (New York: Dutton, 2008). 
 66 
   When the EU-Turkey Statement was concluded, the EU found itself 
balancing both these situations. The 2015 migrant influx had caused political 
tension, both within Member States and towards the EU as a whole. When 
the first attempts to solve the crisis through internal cooperation had failed, 
the EU instead chose to shift the burden of migrants to an external actor; 
Turkey. Up until this point, EU-Turkey relations had been instable, in 
particular regarding Turkey’s potential accession. Following the influx, the 
EU was increasingly willing to include Turkey in exchange for readmission 
of migrants and the general perception of the EU as a competent actor. 
   Within the EU constitutional framework, using informal agreements 
represents a shift from the legislative power to the executive. While this is a 
common reaction at times of crisis, the normalization of such measures tends 
to transform the balance between constitutional organs and have a detrimental 
effect on democratic safeguards. 
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4 Concluding remarks 
By writing this thesis, I hope to provide an overview on how EU policy on 
migration is developing and why the EU-Turkey Statement has been 
subjected to so much discussion. I have done so by analysing the legal nature 
of the EU-Turkey Statement, the political landscape in which it was 
concluded and the interplay between these two. In this final chapter, I wish to 
give a summary of the argument of this thesis and a concise answer to the 
research question. Thereafter I will make some remarks on the need for 
further research on this subject. 
   The research question formulated in the initial chapter was: 
 
Why does the EU-Turkey Statement have an unconventional form? 
 
The purpose of Chapter Two was to explain in what ways the EU-Turkey 
Statement is unconventional and how this affects accountability. This chapter 
was divided in two sections, each focusing on an untraditional aspect of the 
EU-Turkey Statement. The first section concerned who the parties are to the 
Statement. Here, I argued that the EU is the actual party of the Statement. The 
main obstacle for this argument is the General Court order NF v European 
Council. In this case, the General Court found the Statement to be attributable 
to the Member States due to minor details and coincidences of its conclusion. 
This reasoning was in several ways flawed and disregarded previous case law, 
most importantly the established practice on considering division of 
competence. The argument of this section was written through the method of 
explaining outcomes by describing alternatives. As was shown, all outcomes 
would have generated problems. While there are several constitutional issues 
with the current status of the EU-Turkey Statement, these can no longer be 
tried on the EU level. The only conflict that risks reaching the CJEU is the 
violation of the division of competence, which would require the Commission 
to take action against all the Member States. As the Commission facilitated 
the conclusion of the EU-Turkey Statement, this seems very unlikely. 
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   The next section focused on the other unconventional aspect of the 
Statement; its form. Several experts on migration law has provided 
convincing arguments both for and against the legally binding nature of the 
Statement. The Statement regulates a matter of international law and contains 
elements that resemble obligations. There are wordings that indicate a will to 
be legally bound, but also others that imply that the Statement is merely a 
political declaration. Also considering the previous agreements and leaked 
drafts of the Statement, both standpoints are plausible. In case the Statement 
is legally binding, another option is to claim that it was invalid due to the 
shortcomings of its entering. This cannot be done in case the Member States 
are the parties since the Heads of State and Government has indisputable 
competence to enter international agreements. If the EU is the party, it might 
succeed in annulling the agreement if it can show that Turkey knew of their 
constitutional framework. However, it is in practice very rare to invoke 
invalidity of a treaty. 
   The main argument in Chapter Two is that informalization and legal 
uncertainties creates flexibility. This facilitates avoiding accountability since 
it opens up for arguing that the agreement is not legally binding or not 
attributable to the EU. 
   Chapter Three took a broader perspective on the EU-Turkey Statement by 
considering the political context in which the agreement was entered. The 
basis for this analysis was Charles Lipsons four reasons for choosing an 
informal agreement; rapidity, flexibility, invisibility and avoidance of a 
ratification procedure. The characteristics of an informal agreement makes it 
more beneficial than a formal one in situations of crisis and controversy. In 
2015, increasing numbers of asylum seekers were entering Europe through 
Turkey. Due to internal political tension, the EU had to cooperate with Turkey 
despite previous conflicts. The Statement had to be entered quickly to provide 
a solution to the migrant influx. In this situation, an informal agreement is 
easier to enter since it is flexible and a ratification debate is avoided. This 
shift from legislative to executive power is a common reaction to a crisis. 
Unfortunately, it tends to side-step democratic safeguards and bring about 
difficulties in attributing accountability. 
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So, why does the EU-Turkey Statement have an unconventional form? I 
would like to answer this as following: The form of the EU-Turkey Statement 
makes it possible for the EU to avoid accountability. This form facilitates the 
conclusion of controversial, flexible and quick agreements which was 
essential to the EU in its crisis at the time of the 2015 migrant influx.  
   The characteristics of the EU-Turkey Statement is a part of a larger 
development of informalization, both in international law in general and in 
EU readmission arrangement in particular. To make a complete overview of 
this development is outside the scope of this thesis, but I believe there is a 
need for further research of informalization in the field of migration. The 
latest study on the informalization of EU readmission agreements (to my 
knowledge) was undertaken in 2007. However, the development appears to 
have accelerated since 2015. The practice seems to affect Orientalized 
countries and former colonies in particular. I would therefore welcome a 
study on how this informalization is connected to cultural ideas of East/West 
or to global inequality, as reflected in the division of visa mobility.  
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